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Book Review
THE JUSTICES OF STRATEGY
FRANK B. CROSS†
A review of
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE, by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
(Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998).

Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that judges “are apt to be naif,
simple-minded men.”1 Two prominent political scientists, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, beg to differ. They suggest that Supreme
Court Justices are sophisticated and strategic, maximizing their personal public policy preferences while simultaneously satisfying external observers that the Court is legitimately staying within the bounds
of the law.2
Judicial strategy is not much considered by legal scholars. It is
common to speak of strategizing by litigators, but judges are typically
considered to be above such devices. Judges, it is often assumed, sim-

† Visiting Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin.
1. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295
(1920).
2. Justice Frankfurter hinted that Justices may behave strategically when he declared:
The compromises that an opinion may embody, the collaborative effort that it may
represent, the inarticulate considerations that may have influenced the grounds on
which the case went off, the shifts in position that may precede final adjudication–
these and like factors cannot, contemporaneously at all events, be brought to the surface.
Felix Frankfurter, The Administrative Side of Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1
(1949). These are precisely the considerations that Epstein and Knight attempt to bring to the
surface.
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ply and sincerely apply the law to the best of their abilities.3 Walter
Murphy’s classic book, Elements of Judicial Strategy,4 introduced the
concept of judicial strategy in 1964, but legal researchers have paid
his book relatively little heed.5 Into this breach come Epstein and
Knight with their new book, The Choices Justices Make. While the
recent trade book, Closed Chambers,6 has received more press,7
Choices offers a more detailed, and ultimately more interesting, look
at the Supreme Court. Choices recently received the 1998 Herman
Pritchett Award, an annual prize given by the American Political Science Association for the best book published on law and the courts.
This Book Review has three purposes. First, I hope to increase
the legal community’s familiarity with the political science research
about judicial decisionmaking and strategy. This research is extensive
and important. Second, I attempt to identify some shortcomings in
that research, perhaps attributable to a lack of legal understanding
among political scientists. By focusing exclusively on the policy ends
of the Justices, Choices neglects the real complexity associated with
legal concerns. Third, I hope to provoke further research on strategic
Supreme Court decisionmaking. While political scientists require no
further prodding on this matter, the research would benefit from
greater analysis by legal scholars.
Indeed, Choices arrives for review at a time when legal researchers themselves are beginning to focus some attention on judicial
strategy. A growing school of legal research known as “positive political theory” (PPT) has begun to focus on various aspects of judicial
strategy and competing political institutions in courts’ decisionmaking. Some of the most prominent PPT researchers are William

3. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255-64 (1997) (describing the classic
legal model of scholarship); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1642-43 (1998) (describing the tradition
of formal legal theory under which “judicial decisions were based on logical reasoning”).
4. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
5. Nor have political scientists paid great attention to Murphy’s classic book. See LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE xi-xii (1998) (noting its “limited influence”).
6. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998).
7. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1998, at A23 (criticizing CLOSED CHAMBERS and suggesting that the author be prosecuted for breach of trust); Gretchen Craft Rubin, Betraying a Trust, WASH. POST, July 13, 1998,
at A27 (criticizing the book’s “poisonous influence”).
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Eskridge,8 McNollgast,9 and Emerson Tiller.10 PPT has not itself produced a general book such as Choices,11 but Epstein and Knight provide a valuable window into many of the claims and methodologies of
PPT, as well as those of the rational choice field of political science
research.
Epstein and Knight give close scrutiny to the decisions of Supreme Court Justices and discern several patterns of strategic behavior. They find the Justices to be highly strategic in their pursuit of
their ideological policy objectives. These judicial strategies are of two
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Jenna Bednar, Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”:
A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling: How the Court, Congress, and the States
Multiply Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1545 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
Judicial Review Game, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 382 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing
the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Reneging on History?].
9. McNollgast is the nom de plume of Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast on those occasions when they write together. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A
Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995)
[hereinafter McNollgast, Politics and the Courts]; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992). The trio has split up
for other articles. See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn & Weingast, Positive Theory]; John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing
Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63
(1983); Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and
Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994); William H. Riker & Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988).
10. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); John M.
de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J. LAW & ECON. 435 (1996); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998); Emerson H. Tiller, Putting Politics into
the Positive Theory of Federalism: A Comment on Bednar and Eskridge, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1493 (1995) [hereinafter Tiller, Putting Politics into the Positive Theory of Federalism]; Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative
Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997) [hereinafter Tiller & Spiller, Decision Costs]; Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Invitations To Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996).
11. There is an early book, WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973), though it deals with what is generally
known as public choice theory rather than what is now known as positive political theory.
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general types—internal and external. The authors first describe
strategies within the Court, including those used by a Justice in arranging (or avoiding) a grant of certiorari for a case and then in
amassing a majority opinion for his or her political position. Second,
they describe strategies of the Court vis-à-vis other institutions, primarily Congress, by which Justices strive to avoid having their decisions reversed or otherwise undermined by legislation.
This Book Review first discusses the authors’ two categories of
judicial strategy and the considerable evidence they present for their
position. I then consider some limitations of the theory, both theoretical and empirical. Epstein and Knight make a compelling case for
the presence of judicial strategizing on the Supreme Court. Equally
importantly, they describe precisely how such strategizing may take
place and its potential effect upon the law. These findings have significant import for our understanding of Court opinions and the path
of the law. The authors are not satisfied, however, with demonstrating an important role for judicial strategy; they claim that political
strategy explains everything.12 Epstein and Knight’s Justices are engaged in the single-minded pursuit of ideological aims. The authors
believe that the law has no significance in and of itself and that Justices are utterly without respect for, or fidelity to, the law. The Justices, on this view, are set upon maximizing their policy preferences,
constrained only by institutional concerns, such as the risk of legislative reversal of their decisions13 or public perception of their activities.14 In the world depicted in Choices, no Justice does the “right
thing” or has a sense of responsibility or dedication to the law.15
Fortunately, one need not accept this strong and cynical claim in
order to appreciate the value of the book. The authors’ insights are
important and surely contain a substantial measure of truth. Indeed,

12. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at xiii (“[L]aw, as it is generated by the Supreme
Court, is the long-term product of short-term strategic decision making.”).
13. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 138-45.
14. See id. at 157.
15. This vision is roughly consistent with various internal anecdotal tales of the Court,
which have depicted the Justices as ideologically oriented and scheming. See generally
LAZARUS, supra note 6; BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
Insider academic reports present a more respectful but generally similar case. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES (1996); JAMES F. SIMON,
THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995). A
prominent former politician agrees. See Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the
Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 123, 142 (1962) (“Exercising high political
powers, the Court must have a high sense of strategy and tactics.”).
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the authors are doubtless much closer to the truth than is the conventional doctrinal analysis of Court opinions. Epstein and Knight provide a valuable counterbalance, but their political perspective is in
some ways as narrow as the traditional legal perspective. The
authors’ account is nevertheless fascinating and generally informative
and should serve as a useful foundation for additional research on
Supreme Court strategy.
The final part of this Book Review presents some questions
about Supreme Court decisionmaking strategy that require further
research. For example, the naive view of sincere legal decisionmakers
offers a straightforward explanation of why decisions command different-sized majorities or fail to reach a majority opinion altogether.
The sincere legal model also presents no difficulty in explaining why
Justices affirm a significant minority of the decisions they review or
why Justices don’t trade votes. However, these questions become
more perplexing if one embraces Epstein and Knight’s strategic
model in which Justices maximize political preferences—which is not
to say that they cannot be answered given further research and consideration.

I.

STRATEGY WITHIN THE COURT

For the Justices, there are two principal components to strategy
within the Court. First, there is the strategy of the certiorari grant.
Second, there is the strategy of putting together a majority coalition.
There are several strategic points within this decisionmaking process:
discussions, including the discussion at conference; the opinion assignment; the circulation of opinions; and the final vote on the merits.
This process has not been studied extensively by PPT researchers,
who have focused most of their analysis on the role of competing political institutions in the strategy of the Justices.
In discussing the strategy of the certiorari grant, Epstein and
Knight describe “aggressive grants” and “defensive denials.” An aggressive grant occurs when at least four Justices “take a case that may
not warrant review” because the case provides a promising tool for
the development of doctrine in a way that those Justices favor.16 A
defensive denial, by contrast, involves Justices who vote to deny certiorari, even when they disapprove of the decision under review and
16.

EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 80.
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believe it to be significant. They fear that if the case is taken up by
the Court, they will lose on the merits, creating undesirable doctrine.17
Epstein and Knight do not invent the theory of aggressive grants
and defensive denials.18 They even cite a memorandum written to Justice Marshall by one of his clerks, explicitly suggesting that “a defensive denial is in order.”19 However, the authors advance the discussion by recapping research on certiorari voting in the 1982 Term that
considered both the ideology of the voting Justice and that of his
colleagues.20 The authors also review tactics that can influence the
certiorari decision. For example, the Justices occasionally write draft
dissents from denials of certiorari and circulate these dissents to
other members of the Court. The purpose of the draft dissents is to
persuade other Justices to take the case. Indeed, this procedure is
how Bowers v. Hardwick21 ultimately came before the Court.22 The
authors offer interesting data about the frequency with which individual Justices dissented from a denial of certiorari and their relative
success with the tactic.23
Once certiorari is granted, the next strategic node is putting together a majority coalition. Epstein and Knight observe that the Justices consider the opinion assignment central to this process, as the

17. See id. For an example of defensive denial practice, see WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG,
supra note 15, at 132 (reporting that Justices Brennan and Marshall resolved not to vote for
certiorari in Fourth Amendment cases during the Burger Court for fear that Warren Court
precedent might be reversed). A liberal quartet composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Douglas, and Stewart likewise voted against certiorari in obscenity convictions, fearful that review “would convert local [decisions] into national precedents, turn minor inequities into
landmark losses.” Id. at 331. They would not push for review “until a fifth vote to reverse a
conviction seemed likely.” Id.; see also LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 267 (describing how liberal
clerks in the early years of the Rehnquist Court would downplay the certworthiness of certain
cases in order to avoid a decision that could result in a “significant liberal defeat”).
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824
(1995).
19. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 81 (referring to United States v. Wiegand, 812
F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1979)).
20. See id. (explaining the research results of Gregory A. Caldeira and his colleagues,
which show that “justices who are ideologically distant from the majority of their colleagues
tend to cast fewer votes in favor of cert”).
21. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
22. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 61-62.
23. See id. at 63-64. White, Marshall, and Rehnquist most frequently employed the tactic.
Over one-fourth of the time, the draft opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari obtained the
fourth vote necessary to grant certiorari. See id. at 63.
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drafter is given “a great deal of control of a case.”24 The first draft of
a majority opinion may take advantage of two very powerful psychological heuristics—framing25 and anchoring.26 Moreover, the
opinion’s author may seize upon his initial position and be relatively
hesitant to depart from it. Additionally, the resource costs associated
with drafting a concurrence or dissent advantages the initial opinion
assignee.
When the Chief Justice is in the majority, he assigns the opinion.
When the Chief Justice is in the minority, the senior Justice in the
majority assigns the opinion. In a close vote, one strategy is to assign
the opinion to the most tentative member of the majority in hopes of
avoiding a switch of that Justice’s vote.27 A related strategy is to as24. Id. at 127; see also Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 99 (1996) [hereinafter Edelman
& Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice] (contending that the “significance of opinion assignments cannot be overstated”).
25. The framing heuristic describes how the presentation of information affects how it is
evaluated. The matter of school prayer, for example, might be framed as an Establishment
Clause issue of government involvement in religion or as a Free Exercise Clause issue of religious expression. Framing has a demonstrably powerful effect on decisionmaking, and the
opinion writer gets the first crack at framing the issue favorably. See, e.g., N.S. Fagley & Paul
M. Miller, The Effect of Framing on Choice: Interactions with Risk-Taking Propensity, Cognitive Style, and Sex, 16 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 496 (1990); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
26. The anchoring heuristic describes the tendency of people to “anchor” their judgment
on an existing situation or on current information. The initial opinion may set the tone for future discussions, with changes centered on tinkering with its language. For a discussion of the
anchoring effect, see, for example, Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1235-41 (1994).
27. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 310 (reporting that Earl Warren would protect “a bare
majority by giving the writing assignment to its least certain member”); WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 152 (noting that Justice Douglas believed that “the best way to
hold a swing vote was to assign that Justice to write the decision”). Chief Justice Burger similarly would assign opinions to the “least persuaded” member of his majority coalition. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 47. There is evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist also engages
in strategic opinion assignments. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 67 (noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist assigned the opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
(holding that while 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not extend to racial harassment incurred in the
course of employment, it does prohibit racial discrimination in making and enforcing private
contracts and does not require a plaintiff to show that he or she was in fact better qualified than
the person selected for the position) to Justice Kennedy in order to hold his vote). Some empirical research suggests that assignments are often given to the weakest member of the majority coalition. See Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Opinion Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66 (1990); William P. McLauchlan, Ideology and Conflict in Supreme
Court Opinion Assignment, 1942-1962, 25 WESTERN POL. Q. 16 (1972). Chief Justice Burger’s
decision to assign the opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that a carefully
drafted statute, insuring that sentencing is suitably directed and limited, suffices to counteract
the inconsistent imposition of capital punishment by sentencing authorities) to Justice White
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sign the opinion to a strategically adept Justice, such as Brennan, who
will likely be able to hold a majority through compromise.28
However, Justices do not always assign opinions in the ways
mentioned above. Assigners tend to keep particularly important decisions for themselves to retain more control over the ultimate opinion of the Court.29 Some research also shows that assigners may tend
to assign the opinion to a Justice very close to their own position.30
This is probably a better strategy than assigning the opinion to the
“least persuaded” Justice—the latter writer is likely to draft a weaker
opinion than otherwise might be achieved.31 A stronger ally can keep
the majority coalition together through compromise while making
the opinion as strong as possible. Moreover, assigning the opinion to
the most tentative Justice provides no guarantee that the majority
coalition will remain intact.32
A Justice may overplay his strategic hand in opinion assignment.
Chief Justice Burger apparently felt so strongly about the need to asrather than Justice Powell, the weakest member of the majority coalition, may have cost a majority opinion. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 115-16. Similarly, Justice Brennan may have lost
a majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that a defendant employer in a gender discrimination suit may avoid a finding of liability if it proves that it would
have made the same decision even if plaintiff’s gender had not been taken into account), by
taking the opinion himself rather than assigning it to Justice O’Connor, the shakiest member of
his coalition. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 278.
28. Brennan has been called the “strategist behind Supreme Court jurisprudence.”
SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 170.
29. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 271-72 (1993).
30. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
177 (1976); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29, at 268 (reporting data showing that Chief Justices
tend to assign opinions to those ideologically closest to them); see also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 110-12 (1997) [hereinafter BAUM, PUZZLE] (summarizing
research to this effect). Of course, flexibility in strategic opinion assignment is constrained by
the need for a fair division of the writing workload among the Justices.
31. This effect may be counteracted by the desire of Justices to author a majority opinion.
For example, when Justice Douglas assigned an opinion to Justice Harlan, the most moderate
of his majority in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the government may not
suppress protected expression simply because it is offensive to some), Harlan’s opinion was too
weak. When other Justices threatened to write stronger concurrences, Harlan agreed to
strengthen his opinion to command the majority. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note
15, at 152.
32. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29, at 274-75. Empirical research on the Warren
Court found that the marginal Justice was just as likely to abandon a majority when he received
the opinion assignment as when he didn’t. See Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority
Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32
AM. J. POL. SCI. 72 (1988). Nor does assigning an opinion to the fifth Justice improve the prospects for getting additional votes for the opinion. See Saul Brenner et al., Increasing the Size of
Minimum Winning Coalitions on the Warren Court, 23 POLITY 309 (1990).
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sign opinions that he would change or even misreport his conference
vote in order to obtain the assignment right. This produced a considerable backlash from the other Justices.33 Epstein and Knight provide
additional, rigorous evidence of Burger’s strategic approach to opinion writing. They examined the record of Justice Burger’s conference
votes and discovered that he passed on voting an unusually large
number of times, a strategic move that ensured his ability to select
the majority opinion writer.34
Once certiorari has been resolved, the case heard, and the opinion assigned, Epstein and Knight discuss several strategic methods of
coalition building. Obtaining a majority coalition requires a measure
of bargaining with fellow Justices.35 Epstein and Knight illustrate strategic coalition building with an analysis of Craig v. Boren,36 the wellknown decision that established an intermediate level of scrutiny for
gender discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause.37
Craig involved two issues. The male plaintiff in the case complained
of Oklahoma’s law that set the minimum drinking age at eighteen for
females and twenty-one for males. In addition to the equal protection
issues in the case, Craig also involved standing questions, because the
plaintiff had turned twenty-one by the time the case reached the
Court.
Epstein and Knight use the conference notes of Justices Brennan
and Powell to break down the positions of the nine Justices on the
standing question, the standard of scrutiny to be applied to gender
discrimination, and how each believed the case should be resolved. 38
The varied alignments created a tricky bargaining problem. Five Justices felt that the plaintiff had standing and wanted to decide in his
favor, but one of the five (Stewart) favored use of the lenient rational
basis test for gender discrimination, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White wanted strict scrutiny for such cases.39 An opinion
based on the conference positions would either have yielded no majority opinion or a very weak opinion, applying the deferential ra-

33.
34.
35.

See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 127-34.
See id. at 129-30.
See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 304 (3d ed. 1993) (observing “how important postconference deliberations and communications among the chambers have become for the Court’s decision making”).
36. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
37. See id. at 208-09.
38. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.1-2.
39. See id. at 4-7.
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tional basis test to gender discrimination. As the senior Justice in the
majority, Brennan assigned himself the opinion and set out to produce a stronger opinion.
Justice Brennan’s strategy resulted in the intermediate scrutiny
standard. Had he pressed for strict scrutiny, his preferred position, he
could not have mustered a majority. Moreover, the strict scrutiny position risked the possibility that some of the minority Justices might
change their position on standing and put together a firm majority
ruling for the plaintiff by applying the rational basis standard to gender discrimination cases. By adopting the intermediate scrutiny test,
Brennan put together a majority behind a standard for gender discrimination that has survived to this day. Epstein and Knight describe
his action as “sophisticated” and “strategic” and argue that he was
guided by “his beliefs about the preferences of the other actors and
the choices he expected them to make.”40
Some readers might find this conclusion obvious, but the finding
has great significance for the law. Law professors still engage in doctrinal analysis, seeking rational consistency and principle in the
Court’s rulings. The strategic account of Craig implies that such
analysis may be useless and denies the independent relevance of
precedent, except as a strategic tool to be used in compromising
among various positions and institutional concerns.
Political scientists are not satisfied with mere anecdotes, but
41
Craig was not the only case in which the Justices employed strategy.
Epstein and Knight illustrate how the author of a majority opinion
will be especially solicitous of the opinion of the most moderate
member of the majority, or the “fifth Justice.”42 One memorandum

40. Id. at 56:
Brennan took the course of action that any rational actor, concerned with maximizing his policy preferences, would take. In other words, for Brennan to set policy as
close as possible to his ideal point, strategic behavior was essential. In this instance,
he needed to act in a sophisticated fashion, given his beliefs about the preferences of
the other actors and the choices he expected them to make.
41. Brennan engaged in a similar episode of strategic opinion writing in Keyes v. Denver
School District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that state-imposed segregation in part of a school
district may allow a finding of a dual system in the entire district). See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 95-96. Justice Brennan was reportedly “always willing to mold his language to
meet the objections of his colleagues.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 164. See generally George,
supra note 3, at 1660-62 (discussing negotiations over the content of opinions).
42. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 66; see also SIMON, supra note 15, at 148-49
(discussing liberal strategy in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)). Justice Brennan assigned the opinion to Justice Stevens with the understanding that he would “be writing his ma-
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from Justice Rehnquist to other members of his coalition reported
that he had been “negotiating with John Stevens for considerable
time in order to produce a fifth vote” and that he had “agreed to
make the following changes in the currently circulating draft.”43 In
44
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, Justice Stevens was clearly the fifth
Justice (the Court split 4-4 before he assumed his position), and he
controlled the opinion even though no other Justice really agreed
with his legal position.45 The opinion in Baker v. Carr46 was significantly limited by the need to gain Justice Stewart’s fifth vote.47 In a
close case, a majority is often forced to make substantive compromises in order to obtain an opinion of the Court. Conversely, the minority coalition will try to capture the majority’s fifth Justice through
a persuasive preliminary dissenting opinion.48
Under the strategic view, the fifth Justice clearly carries most of
the power within the Court. By controlling the decision, this Justice
can control the opinion. Some Justices may have affirmatively employed a “deliberate strategy” of “[o]ccupying the pivot” on the
Court.49 There is an active debate among legal scholars over the iden-

jority opinion with the objective of holding O’Connor’s vote.” Id. at 148-49. Justice Stevens
made numerous revisions in an effort to please Justice O’Connor but ultimately failed. See id.
43. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 74. Woodward and Armstrong relate how Supreme Court obscenity doctrine was controlled by Justice Blackmun, who demanded concessions from Chief Justice Burger as a condition for becoming the fifth vote. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 299.
44. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Civil Service Commission regulation
that barred resident aliens from holding most federal jobs).
45. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 477. Although Justice Stevens
thought the discrimination against aliens was unconstitutional because it was based only on a
Civil Service Commission regulation, he differed from the other eight Justices because he
thought it might well be constitutional for Congress or the President to ban aliens from federal
jobs. See id.
46. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the federal courts may review legislative apportionments under the Equal Protection Clause).
47. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 222 (“Since Justice Stewart’s vote was then necessary for the bare majority in favor of reversal, the Chief Justice and the other three agreed that
Justice Brennan would limit his draft opinion to the jurisdictional issue.”).
48. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 77 (reprinting an excerpt of a memorandum
from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Stewart urging that the latter Justice draft a quick dissent,
because the majority’s fifth vote, Justice White, was “tentative” in his conference vote). The
majority, by contrast, may attempt to capture the votes of dissenters by modifying an opinion.
See Saul Brenner et al., Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on the Supreme Court, 36 JURIMETRICS J.
245, 253 (1996).
49. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 515 (describing how Justice Kennedy boasted of employing
this strategy).
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tity of the fifth Justice and the method for ascertaining this identity.50
This debate assumes the existence of such a pivotal Justice and his or
her significance.
Another strategic node involves the first draft of a majority
opinion. The opinion assignee may take the preferences of his or her
colleagues into account in the first draft, but it may be more strategic
not to compromise at this early stage. A relatively uncompromising
initial draft leaves leverage for later bargaining. After a first draft of
the majority opinion is circulated throughout the Court, additional
communication and negotiation ensues. Epstein and Knight use
51
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey to illustrate
this process. The case involved a challenge by Hasidic Jews to the redistricting process. The initial positions of the Justices were: five to
affirm the state redistricting plan (Stevens, Powell, Blackmun, White,
and Burger); two to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted
(Stewart and Rehnquist); one to remand (Brennan); and one not participating (Marshall).52 Assigned the majority opinion, Justice White
began by adopting a rationale for which there had been little enthusiasm at conference. Justice Stevens then circulated a concurring
opinion. Justice Brennan then sought to strike a bargain with White,
sending a bargaining statement and offering to join White’s opinion if
certain modifications were made. White then revised his opinion to
incorporate the approach of Stevens’s concurrence, causing Stevens
to join the majority opinion.53

50. See Edelman & Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice, supra note 24, at 63 (1996) (setting
forth a methodology for identifying the Court’s “swing” vote); see also Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 187 (1996) [hereinafter Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence] (responding to
Edelman and Chen and criticizing their methodology for identifying the fifth Justice); Paul H.
Edelman & Jim Chen, “Duel” Diligence: Second Thoughts About the Supremes as the Sultans of
Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 219 (1996) [hereinafter Edelman & Chen, “Duel” Diligence]
(responding to Baker’s criticisms).
51. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding an intentionally created black state assembly district
whose creation foreseeably resulted in the splitting of a community of Hasidic Jews who had
previously been concentrated in one district).
52. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 68.
53. See id. Bernard Schwartz provides another remarkable example of the willingness of
Justices to compromise by quoting a memorandum from Chief Justice Rehnquist written in regard to Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991). Rehnquist wrote:
I prefer the position taken in the most recent circulation of my proposed opinion for
the Court, but want very much to avoid a fractionated court on this point. . . . If a
majority prefers Nino’s view, I will adopt it; if I can get a majority for the view contained in the present draft, I will adhere to that. If there is some ‘middle ground’ that
will attract a majority, I will even adopt that.
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Epstein and Knight also closely examine the bargaining statements made by Justices in the 1983 Term. They report that some sort
of bargaining memorandum was circulated in 64% of the cases reviewed, a figure which does not include private memoranda or casual
oral communications. The average case had six public memoranda.54
The authors also examine “landmark cases,” some of the most important decisions of the 1970s and 1980s.55 In these cases, they find considerable evidence of bargaining through private memoranda.56
Moreover, drafts of majority opinions are frequently rewritten with
major changes, a fact that provides empirical evidence of the significance of internal memoranda among the Justices.57 Epstein and
Knight describe, for ten major cases, the major opinion changes made
in direct response to bargaining statements.58 The description makes
it clear that such bargaining statements are an important element in
Court decisionmaking.
In addition to circulating brief bargaining statements, a Justice
may take a stronger stand by circulating a full dissenting or concurring opinion to the entire Court. The former is presumably intended
to persuade a member of the majority to switch, while the latter
threatens the “majority” opinion writer with the prospect that his or
her opinion may not command a majority of votes. Once again, Epstein and Knight closely examine cases from the 1983 Term as well as
landmark cases. The circulation of a dissent, concurrence, or unla-

SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 21.
54. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 72.
55. Landmark cases were identified as those listed in ELDER WITT, GUIDE TO THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 915-26 (2d ed. 1990), that were decided during the 1969-1985 Terms. See
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 78 tbl.3-3. For a listing of ten landmark cases, see infra
note 58.
56. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 72-73.
57. See id. at 98-99. The authors report that opinion writers produce 3.2 drafts in typical
cases and nearly four drafts in landmark cases. See id. at 98. Among landmark cases, 64.8% saw
a major change in opinion, and 45.2% of all 1983 Term cases saw such a change. See id. at 99.
Epstein and Knight carefully lay out how they defined “major change,” including in that category a substantial deletion of a section, a switch in whether a prior case was overruled, an introduction of a new rationale, etc. See id.
58. See id. at 100-05 (listing Garcia v. SAMTA, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), H.L. v. Matheson, 451 U.S. 398 (1981),
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976),
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971)).
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beled opinion ultimately influenced the majority opinion in over 25%
of the landmark cases and over 10% of the 1983 Term cases.59
Some strategies depend upon getting Justices to switch their
votes, so that a dissent may become a majority opinion or a majority
opinion may command more support. While Epstein and Knight believe that Justices are always exercising their exogenous ideological
preferences, they claim that the Justices’ votes are at least somewhat
protean. Vote switching does not occur randomly, however. The
smaller the coalition at conference, the more likely the Justice is to
switch. A lone dissenter is most likely to switch, making the decision
unanimous.60 The probability of switching steadily declines as the size
of the coalition grows.61 One study of the Vinson Court found that
Justices switched their vote between conference and the final opinion
9.7% of the time; there was a switch of at least one vote in 44% of the
cases.62 This frequency leaves a respectable amount of room for postconference persuasion and strategy.63
It must be pointed out, however, that of all vote switches, fewer
than 6% occur in a five-person majority coalition.64 This suggests that
post-conference strategy plays a limited role in explaining the ultimate decision reached by the Court. Of course, changing 6% of Supreme Court decisions may be quite significant in an absolute sense.
Bernard Schwartz has catalogued a number of very important decisions resulting from a vote switch after conference.65

59. See id. at 78.
60. Lone dissenters at conference switched to the majority nearly 37% of the time. See
Brenner et al., supra note 48, at 250.
61. For the Vinson Court, coalitions of two saw switches more than 24% of the time; of
three, 25% of the time; of four, 17% of the time; and so on to an initial unanimous vote, in
which the probability of switching was less than 1%. See id. at 249. A study on a more recent
Court generally confirms these patterns. See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic
Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581, 58789 (1996).
62. See Brenner et al., supra note 48, at 248.
63. One cannot necessarily ascribe all of these switches to judicial strategizing as they may
have been sincere responses to legal persuasion. But strategizing may also occur before the
conference vote, so evidence of strategy is not limited to instances of switching. Moreover, evidence indicates that many switches are prompted by strategy. See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note
30, at 106-07 (reporting evidence of bargaining over opinion language).
64. See Brenner et al., supra note 48, at 248.
65. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 178-255 (listing, for example, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (5-4 decision), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4
decision), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (5-4 decision)).
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A Supreme Court case passes through a series of strategic nodes
on its way to a decision. Choices made at each node may determine
the decision and almost certainly will influence the opinion. The strategic deftness (or ineptness) of a specific Justice may substantially affect this nation’s legal doctrine. This should not be surprising. Anecdotal tales of the Court have revealed the important role of strategy,66
and such strategy is probably an unavoidable aspect of group decisionmaking. However, the practice does raise normative questions
about the proper role of the Court in our democracy.67

II. STRATEGY BEYOND THE COURT
The Court is but one of several interacting political institutions
in this country. Decisions do not automatically actualize the Court’s
policies. The impact of Court opinions may depend upon the compliance of Congress or other external actors; cooperation with a Court
holding cannot be automatically presumed.68 In some cases the other
institutions of government may override the Court’s decisions. For
example, if the Court interprets a federal statute in a particular manner, Congress may rewrite the statute to contravene the Court’s policy.69 Congress has a variety of other powers over the Court, including
authority over jurisdiction and budget.70 PPT research has focused its

66. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 6; WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15.
67. See Book Note, Democracy and Dishonesty, 106 HARV. L. REV. 792, 793 (1993)
(discussing the belief that “cynical strategizing by the Court seems the very essence of democratic betrayal”).
68. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT (1955), reprinted in JUDGES ON JUDGING, 20, 20-22 (David M. O’Brien ed.,
1997) (observing that the Court is dependent on other branches of government to implement its
decisions and may have its jurisdiction limited by Congress); Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for
Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993 (1993),
reprinted in JUDGES ON JUDGING, supra, at 73 (reporting that constraints imposed by political
system are “often overlooked but awesome nonetheless”).
69. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994) (redefining “fraud” in the mail fraud statute to contravene the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that term in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 358-360 (1987)); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 960 (1989) (recognizing Congress’s rejection of the Court’s interpretation of fraud in McNally and stating that McNally had
been superseded by statute).
70. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 252-53 (6th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
BAUM, SUPREME COURT] (discussing Congress’s “enormous powers over the Court”).
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attention on these issues, especially the interplay of Congress and the
Court.71 Choices acknowledges and builds upon much of this research.
Strategy within the Court is generally conducted with an eye to
external constituencies. The decision to accept a case may be influenced by the potential public and governmental reaction to the
Court’s involvement. The authors’ small study on cases involving civil
rights in employment shows that a conservative Court was more
willing to grant certiorari to such cases when there was a Republican
President to help prevent the reversal of its rulings.72 The opinion assignment may also be influenced by external factors—an opinion by
the Chief Justice may carry greater weight or a certain Justice may
possess particularly respected expertise in a given area.73 Finally,
voting on the merits can be influenced by anticipated external reactions. The “more authoritative a holding . . . the less likely that Congress will attempt to overturn it.”74 Unanimity is one important way
to make a decision authoritative.75
Like most PPT analysts, Epstein and Knight focus on the prospect of congressional reversal. The Justices sometimes appear to attend to the risk of such a reversal. This issue is generally associated
with William Eskridge, who examined congressional reversals of the
Court and demonstrated the salience of the risk.76 Justices therefore
must exercise a measure of self-restraint in advancing their own policy preferences, given the presence of outside institutions with the
power to undermine the effects of the Court’s opinion. Congress also
may attempt to control the Court’s decisions through other devices,
such as budgetary or jurisdictional restrictions.77 The Court’s deci-

71. See sources cited supra notes 8-10. Tiller has also studied the relationships among different levels of courts and between the courts and the bureaucracy. See sources cited supra note
10.
72. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 83-84.
73. See id. at 127; Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion
Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 427 (1996).
74. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 85.
75. See id. at 106 (noting that a “unanimous opinion in . . . a major case would have a
greater chance of remaining undisturbed by external political actors than a divided opinion”).
76. See generally Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court, supra note 8; Eskridge, Reneging
on History?, supra note 8.
77. See generally Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 433 (1996) (arguing
that Congress’s budgetary allocations to the Supreme Court help explain the Court’s voting
behavior in certain instances).
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sions, then, may often reflect congressional preferences rather than
the Justices’ own.
Epstein and Knight add internal evidence to the existing research on the Justices’ concern with legislative reversal. After reviewing the reports of conference discussions, they find that in nearly
60% of the cases examined there is some comment about the preferences and likely actions of other government actors.78 Moreover,
these comments are more frequent in nonconstitutional cases, when
the risk of reversal is far greater than in constitutional ones (although
the authors believe that the concern is also present in a significant
number of constitutional cases).79 This is certainly evidence of the
Justices’ concern for the actions of institutions beyond the Court.
However, Epstein and Knight’s discussion of strategy beyond the
Court is somewhat less persuasive than their review of strategy within
the Court. The authors’ coding of references to other institutions
seems quite broad. Consider one of the authors’ examples, in which
Justice Blackmun expresses disagreement with a Court precedent on
the Civil Rights Act but declines to propose a reversal because
“Congress has accepted” the precedent.80 To Epstein and Knight, this
evidence of concern for congressional preferences is strategic. To me,
it sounds like a Justice adhering to legal principle, even at the expense of his policy preferences.81 In a statutory interpretation action,
the law dictates that the Court enforce the intent of the enacting
Congress, which obviously requires consideration of legislative preference but has little to do with the risk of reversal, which involves
preferences of the contemporaneous Congress. The authors’ position
would be more persuasive if they limited themselves to the Justices’
discussion of the preferences of the contemporaneous Congress, but
they do not do so.82
Empirical evidence does not particularly support the authors’
contention that the Court, concerned about having their decisions re-

78. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 149.
79. See id. at 149-50.
80. Id. at 139 (quoting Justice Powell’s transcript of the conference discussion).
81. A general principle of statutory interpretation suggests that when Congress accepts
and does not attempt to reverse a statutory opinion, that fact is evidence that the Court correctly assessed legislative intent. For a discussion of the principle, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 242-43 (1994).
82. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 150 (reporting that Justice Brennan took into
consideration the enacting legislature’s intent in his attempts to formulate beliefs about congressional preferences and likely actions).
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versed, attends closely to the preferences of the other branches.83 The
“determinants of congressional action on an issue are highly complex,
and this complexity leads to the notorious difficulty of predicting that
action.”84 When decisions produce a mixed public response, the risk
of override is very low.85 Why, then, should a Justice compromise his
or her policy preferences in deference to Congress, when the prospects of congressional reversal are uncertain at best?86 Given general
public respect for the Court, its opinion may itself change congressional and public preferences, further minimizing the risk of an override.87 Moreover, even when reversal does occur, the new statutory
policy may be no worse than that adopted by a conciliatory Court. As

83. While empirical research has demonstrated that congressional overrides occur, this is
evidence that the Court may not closely attend to congressional preferences. If the Court were
modifying decisions to comport with the preferences of the current Congress, one might expect
most reversals to occur after time and congressional composition has changed. Yet nearly half
of the reversals actually occur within two years of the Court’s decision. See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 345. One interesting study of search and seizure cases
found Congress had no effect on the Court’s decisions but found that the President did. See
Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778, 79295 (1997).
If the Justices feared congressional override, they might be expected to take more constitutional cases during times when Congress might be expected to override statutory interpretation decisions. This hypothesis has been tested. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
ASSESSING CROSS-INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING
(Washington University Political Science Working Paper No. 343, 1997). The authors found
only a slight effect, largely because the congressional preferences seldom imposed a material
constraint on the Court’s preferences and because ideologically homogenous Courts did not
respond even when a constraint existed. See id. at 19-21.
84. BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 97 (footnote omitted); see also Michael E. Solimine
& James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 425, 437 (1992) (concluding that the reversals may be “simply the
product of the confluence of randomly occurring factors, each with variable probabilities at different points in time”).
85. See Harry P. Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377, 391-92 (1965).
86. See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30:
[E]ven strategy-minded justices might give little attention to the possibility of overrides in most cases, for any of several reasons: they view overrides as too uncommon
to worry about, they find it difficult to predict the prospects of an override, or they
can continue to shape the affected policy in future cases even if an override occurs.
Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
87. See Mark C. Miller, Courts, Agencies, and Congressional Committees: A NeoInstitutional Perspective, 55 REV. POL. 471, 478-79 (1993) (describing how three congressional
committees held the federal courts in high regard).
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a general rule, the best strategy would seem to be for Justices to vote
as they wish, even if they suffer the occasional legislative reversal.88
There is strong attitudinal model evidence which shows that Justices consistently vote their policy preferences.89 This evidence suggests that the Court is not significantly constrained by Congress or
other institutions. A recent study by Jeffrey Segal carefully examined
Supreme Court statutory decisions in civil liberties cases heard in the
last fifty years.90 Segal explained theoretically why Justices seldom
need fear congressional reversal, noting the high costs of such action,
the multiple vetoes precluding such action (committee chairperson,
median congressperson, President, and others), and the ability of the
Court to manipulate issues strategically.91 He hypothesized that if the
Justices did fear reversal, they would change their votes as the composition of Congress changed. This did not occur—Segal found that
the Justices’ votes could be predicted by their own ideological preferences and were unaffected by the preferences of Congress.92 While
Segal’s study does not demonstrate that the Court never considers
possible legislative override, it is persuasive evidence that such a concern is not common.93

88. Walter Murphy recognized that the Justices might have to defer to Congress but argued that the Court should not generally do so, because passing overriding legislation is quite
difficult, because the Court’s own prestige would reduce the risk of such an override, and because a practice of timidity would diminish the Court’s prestige and thereby weaken the Court
politically. See MURPHY, supra note 4, at 175.
89. See, e.g., Boucher & Segal, supra note 18, at 824 (observing that “attitudinalists argue
that the institutional structures insulating the Court from its political environment and the presumed finality of judicial decisions allow the Court to ignore the preferences of Congress, the
president, the mass public, and other interested parties”).
90. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997).
91. See id. at 31-32.
92. See id. at 39-42. Another recent study found that the likelihood of the Court overturning a precedent is strongly affected by ideological change on the Court but unaffected by the
ideological composition of Congress. See James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overturning of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
93. Epstein and Knight acknowledge Segal’s research but cite to a number of other articles
to characterize it as contrary to the “preponderance of research.” EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra
note 5, at 155-56 n.g (citing, for example, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE
SUPREME COURT (1961), WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962),
and Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65-110 (Spring 1994)). This seems a bit disingenuous. Segal’s study is clearly the best
study of the issue, and truth is not found by counting articles, especially when nonempirical
ones are included.
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The threat of congressional reversal may exist when the Court is
ideologically out of step with Congress and the President and when
the issue is one of high political salience. But even in these circumstances, Justices are not likely to choose to compromise their decisions. Why would the Court grant certiorari in a case and then defer
to Congress and issue an opinion that the Justices find undesirable?
More strategic, surely, would be a decision to deny certiorari in such
a case.94 Even if the lower court’s decision was undesirable, why reinforce it with a Supreme Court affirmance compelled by fear of reversal? Perhaps this is why Segal found no evidence of congressional influence on the votes of Justices in the cases accepted for review.
However, the strategy of certiorari may include considerations of
congressional reversal.
More persuasive is Epstein and Knight’s discussion of the Justices’ amorphous concern for the Court’s reputation and legitimacy
among the general public and the other branches. Given the authors’
belief that the Court is concerned only with public policy, one might
question why the Justices do not issue advisory opinions or other dictates regarding such policy. Epstein and Knight’s answer is that doing
so would destroy respect for the Court and undermine its influence.95
Walter Murphy similarly suggested that people “are more ready to
accept unpleasant decisions which appear to be the ineluctable result
of rigorously logical deductions.”96 Justices therefore must be able to
maintain an illusion of adherence to legal principle. This in turn
surely requires that they in fact adhere to that principle with some
frequency.
The Justices’ concerns about public perception seem to affect
other strategic decisions by the Court, including some decisions that
may formally violate the law. For example, at the end of the tenure of

94. This rationale would not apply to one scenario. Suppose that four Justices are in tune
with Congress and five are out of step, even beyond the position of all the multiple veto points.
In this scenario, the four would vote for certiorari, and the other five would be compelled to go
along in the decision, or risk congressional reversal. However, there is no evidence that this
scenario has ever arisen.
95. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 159-63 (discussing how Justices seldom
raise issues sua sponte and reasoning that this is necessary to protect the Court’s legitimacy).
96. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 17; see also id. at 31 (observing that “the Court’s prestige—
and therefore a large measure of its power—is based on its status as a court of law in the common law tradition”); Book Note, supra note 67, at 794 (“Further, if, in the interest of candor,
the Court concedes the consideration of politics in its decisionmaking, then it will lose the legitimacy required to demand adherence to its most controversial decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
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Justice Douglas, the Court held over cases in which Douglas was in a
5-4 majority, due to the fear that a conservative replacement for the
Justice might result in “half a dozen major decisions being reversed
in a year’s time.”97 The Court has entirely avoided some highly political controversies, such as the legality of the Vietnam conflict.98
Moreover, in their dealings with the press, the Justices have assiduously portrayed themselves as being above mere politics.99 Both the
critics and defenders of Roe v. Wade100 believed that the Justices considered public reaction in making their decision.101 Finally, concern
for public acceptance may have enormous practical importance, as
suggested by the Warren Court’s decision to uphold the death penalty; some have suggested that this decision was motivated by a fear
that the Court had already “spread its political capital too thin.”102 If
the Court is indeed influenced by its public standing, it may follow
that public pressure has a measurable influence on Supreme Court
strategy.
III. STRATEGY TO WHAT END?
Strategy is a means, not an end in itself. Contemporary political
science is enamored of rational choice theory, which typically identifies a central objective of each political actor and then theorizes
about how the actor could best achieve this objective, given external
constraints.103 Epstein and Knight apply this paradigm to judicial decisionmaking. There must be a central objective toward which Jus97. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 435. Such a series of reversal would
make the Court appear to be a “political institution,” a perception feared by the Justices. See
id.
98. See id. at 144-47 (detailing Justice Douglas’s failed efforts to bring the constitutionality
of the Vietnam conflict before the Court and reporting that the Court showed “little stomach
for the issue”).
99. See generally RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRESS (1994).
100. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. When the Court took a case to reconsider Roe, the Justices were swamped with letters
and public protests. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 373-74. These efforts were “mainly political
lobbying—an attempt to make the Justices think in terms of constituencies and then bring constituent pressure to bear.” Id. at 374. The crucial plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), may have responded by “creating a position politically tenable outside the
Court and strategically tenable within.” LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 485.
102. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 88.
103. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (1994) (describing and criticizing the importance of rational choice theory in
political science research).
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tices strategize, and the authors identify this as the Justices’ public
policy preferences.104 Liberal Justices seek to advance their ideological agenda, while conservative Justices pursue their contrary ends.105
The authors’ position is consistent with that commonly taken by PPT,
but it is not necessary to a theory of strategy.106
By “public policy” the authors do not mean legal policy, such as
the proper state of standing doctrine, but something more closely
akin to ideological policy, such as the proper state of environmental
regulation. Epstein and Knight implicitly contend that the Justices do
not care about legal policy at all. Of course, distinguishing between
public policy and legal policy can be difficult. For example, a judicial
action protecting freedom of speech may be either a public policy
preference or evidence of legal dedication to the First Amendment.107
Many political scientists have conducted empirical studies to
demonstrate that the votes of most Justices are the product of public
policy preferences. The classic attitudinal or behavioral model contends that Justices simply vote their policy preferences, and supports
this thesis with empirical studies showing that policy preferences effectively predict votes.108 The alternative model claims that the Justices are “political” in a different sense, and frequently follow the
public will and the will of other branches of government.109 Epstein
104. This view of Justices as concerned primarily with policy ends is consistent with the
bulk of political science research. See Cross, supra note 3, at 265-79 (describing this “attitudinal
model” of judicial decisionmaking). Among political scientists this view is clearly the
“conventional wisdom.” See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 70.
105. The ideological characterization of judicial outcomes is common in political science
research. For an example of ideological categorization, see George, supra note 3, at 1673-74.
106. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Weingast, Positive Theory, supra note 9, at 265 (noting that many
models assume that courts act “on the basis of their preferences (or ideologies) rather than out
of principles” but that “PPT is not committed to any such Realpolitik vision of the judiciary”).
107. On the difficulty of distinguishing between principled legal decisionmaking and ideological political decisionmaking, see Cross, supra note 3, at 290-94.
108. There is a wealth of empirical scholarship contending that judicial decisions are driven
by the judges’ political attitudes. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29; Lawrence Baum,
Membership Change and Collective Voting Change in the United States Supreme Court, 54 J.
POL. 1 (1992); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 843 (1961); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).
109. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1989); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 293-94 (1957); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). Judges may act politically only when they are confident that
their aggressive position is fundamentally supported by the public. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY
& EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 219 (1998)
(finding that judges abandon texts only when their beliefs are “strongly felt and widely held,
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and Knight blend these two approaches, suggesting that Justices try
to effect their personal policy preferences but must bend to the will
of the other branches on occasion. The latter acquiescence springs
not from any respect for democratic principle, however, but is merely
a strategic means of optimizing personal policy preferences. The
authors don’t admit an independent role for the law qua law.
A common criticism of the political scientists’ analyses is that
they give insufficient attention to the internal workings of the
Court.110 Epstein and Knight certainly cannot be criticized on this
score. They rely extensively on truly internal information, such as the
case files of Justices Brennan and Marshall and a variety of records
from Justice Powell, among other sources.111 These records enable the
authors to visualize the internal workings of the Court, especially the
discussions at conference. Their review is far more “internal” than is
conventional political science research. These internal discussions
presumably reflect much greater candor than do the written opinions
of the Court.
Epstein and Knight’s review of the internal workings of the
Court appears to show that policy plays a considerable role. They
drew a random sample of cases orally argued during the 1983 Term
and categorized the remarks of each Justice. They coded the remarks
as relating to precedent, to policy concerns and to threshold procedural issues. The authors found that nearly half of “the justices’ conference comments involved policy concerns.”112 The authors then reviewed the bargaining memoranda circulated in the same case
sample. They found that 65% of the suggestions in such memoranda
were requests for policy-oriented changes.113
The evidence presented by the authors clearly demonstrates that
public policy is a significant factor motivating the Justices. Epstein
and Knight, though, are not satisfied with demonstrating the significance of policy concerns in the decisions of the Court. They are determined to claim that the Justices have an “exclusive focus” on polthat is that these beliefs are truly elements of social morality”). Feeley and Rubin suggest that
“the judiciary proved to be quite sensitive to changes in public opinion” over time. Id. at 332.
But see BAUM, SUPREME COURT, supra note 70, at 217-18 (arguing that the “Court’s two distinctive policy positions in the twentieth century”—resistance to the New Deal and expansion
of civil liberties in the Warren Court—“had only minority support” from the populace).
110. See Cross, supra note 3, at 280-82 (discussing this criticism of political science research).
111. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at xv.
112. Id. at 29.
113. See id. at 32.
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icy goals.114 However, they must confront the fact that their data indicate that 25.5% of the conference statements refer to precedent and
another 13.8% refer to threshold issues such as jurisdiction.115 The
authors observe that some of these comments regard altering or
overruling precedents. Making an illogical leap, they then claim that
the results do not provide support for the view that Justices are motivated to reach decisions in line with precedent.116 The authors provide
no evidence that nearly all mentions of precedent call for overruling
or ignoring them; their argument is supported by a mere handful of
examples. The remainder of Part III outlines limitations to the argument that Justices are pure policy-seekers and contends that judicial
behavior is more complex than is assumed by Choices.
A. Limits of the Evidence on Judicial Policy
In several respects, the evidence in Choices does not support the
authors’ extravagant conclusion about the Justices and policy. As
noted above, a substantial minority of the Justices’ comments at conference refer to precedent, and Epstein and Knight have failed to explain away all these references. Additionally, the authors’ argument
suffers from three broad flaws.
First, Epstein and Knight downplay evidence from their own research that shows that Justices do have some concern for the law, independent of any ideological policy. In the certiorari process, for example, they acknowledge that a legally principled decision might be
to take a case to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts. Supreme
Court Rule 10 states that the presence of such a conflict is a factor in
the granting of certiorari.117 Epstein and Knight themselves illustrate
the relevance of this principle. Their discussion of Bowers v. Hard118
wick explains how certiorari was granted in part due to the persua114. Id. at 36. Former clerk Edward Lazarus apparently feels the same way, writing that
“[n]either [liberals nor conservatives] respected precedent, except when convenient; both sides
tried to twist the Court’s internal rules to attain narrow advantage.” LAZARUS, supra note 6, at
8.
115. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 30.
116. See id. at 30-31. In an earlier article, the authors appear to concede that these conference discussions do indicate some sincere concern for precedent. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1024-28 (1996).
117. “The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter . . . .” SUP. CT. R. 10.
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sive effect of Justice White’s dissent from the denial. The substance
of that dissent involved the need to resolve a conflict among the circuits.119 The existence of this enormously important decision is thus at
least partially attributable to Court concerns about conflicts and legal
policy.
Epstein and Knight do not want to accept that Justices might be
so principled, however, claiming that “equally impressive”120 evidence
refutes the legal perspective. They note that between 1953 and 1995,
the Court specifically mentioned conflict as a reason for granting certiorari in only 24% of cases.121 This statistic is potentially misleading,
as there may have been other cases in which the Court took conflict
into account but was not explicit in doing so. Epstein and Knight may
have understated the number of cases granted certiorari due to circuit court conflicts. They counted only those grants in which the Supreme Court expressly cited such a conflict as its reason for certiorari. Arthur Hellman adds to this figure cases in which the Court’s
opinion pointed clearly to the existence of a conflict and cases in
which the conflict was explicitly acknowledged by a circuit court.122
He found that a conflict existed in slightly over 50% of the statutory
cases taken by the Court from the courts of appeals between 1983
and 1985 and in about 85% of the cases taken between 1993 and
1995.123 These statistics indicate that the Court is concerned with resolving intercircuit conflicts. Finally, Hellman also found that ideological preferences did not appear to have a significant effect on certiorari decisions.124 However, even if one accepts the authors’ 24%
figure, that number represents a substantial minority of certiorari
grants, the significance of which cannot be easily dismissed.
Epstein and Knight also argue that in 1989 the Justices declined
to review more than 200 intercircuit conflict cases that fell within
Rule 10 in some respect.125 This is not compelling evidence—no one
119. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 61 (focusing on Justice White’s threat to publish his dissent).
120. Id. at 40.
121. See id.
122. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 403, 415.
123. See id. at 416 tbl.3.
124. See id. at 428 (noting that in the 1990s, for “every category of federal-court litigation,
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ grants appear in numbers that are virtually equal”).
125. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 40 (citing BAUM, SUPREME COURT, supra
note 70, at 114). The authors do not specify how many of these cases involved a conflict among
the circuits.
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suggests that the Court is obliged to take all alleged intercircuit conflicts. Hellman has carefully examined the intercircuit conflicts presented to the Court for which certiorari was denied.126 As he noted,
the Court might sensibly deny review of a conflict in many circumstances, as when “the conflict is not yet ripe for definitive resolution;
the case is not an appropriate vehicle for deciding the question; or the
issue is not one of continuing importance.”127 Hellman found that
most conflicts were eventually resolved by subsequent Court decisions or litigation or failed to generate continuing litigation and do
not persist.128 Given these limitations on the true extent of the intercircuit conflict problem, it may very well be the case that the Court is
granting certiorari in all or most of the salient, persistent conflicts
among the circuits.
Other evidence suggests that legal concerns are important in the
Court’s certiorari process. H.W. Perry closely examined the certiorari
process, conducting numerous interviews with the Justices. He found
some evidence of concern for policy objectives and strategic behavior
but concluded that “the Court acts much less strategically than we
political scientists might expect.”129 An earlier review by Doris
Provine likewise found that the Justices did not “appear routinely to
calculate probable outcomes on the merits in deciding whether or not
to vote for review.”130 The evidence that the Justices are concerned
with nothing but policy objectives is simply not as strong as Epstein
and Knight imply.131 Research also shows that the Supreme Court sincerely considers the correction of legal errors made by lower courts
in deciding whether to grant certiorari.132
The second broad problem with the authors’ argument is that the
authors’ data conflate different types of policy arguments, thereby

126. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995). Hellman analyzed 210 cases of circuit
conflicts that the Supreme Court did not review during the 1988, 1989, and 1990 Terms. See id.
127. Id. at 732-33.
128. See id. at 792.
129. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 144 (1991).
130. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
130 (1980).
131. A recent review of the research characterized the evidence on outcome prediction of
strategic certiorari voting as “mixed.” See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 112.
132. See id. at 79 (summarizing this research and citing, among others, PROVINE, supra note
130, and Donald R. Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions
on Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185, 1185-94 (1979)).
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obscuring the decisionmaking process. They note the frequency of
policy arguments at the Court and assume that every policy argument
is an expression of the Justices’ personal policy preferences. But a
policy argument may instead be an expression of congressional policy
that the judges are sworn to uphold.133 Supreme Court opinions are
replete with references to policy, but they nearly always reflect respect for a congressional policy.134 When the authors coded a comment as a “policy argument,” they apparently did not distinguish between a Justice expressing his or her own preferred policy and a
Justice discussing the congressionally preferred policy. Epstein and
Knight’s example of a policy argument comes from notes taken by
Justice Brennan at a conference discussion, in which Justice Stevens
is noted as addressing a Title VII action and stating that the “clearly
prohibited is policy not to hire blacks or women.”135 To Epstein and
Knight, Justice Stevens is expressing personal public policy preference in his conference notes. To me, the comment noted by Brennan
sounds much more like a discussion of the congressional policy behind the statute rather than Stevens’s personal preference (though it
presumably reflects both). Perhaps the references to congressional
policy are insincere projections of personal policy, but the authors’
evidence doesn’t prove this.
A third problem with Epstein and Knight’s claims is that their
analysis of the Justices’ comments focuses on the margin and ignores
matters of consensus. Imagine a case in which all nine Justices agree
upon 90% of the opinion, including perhaps the application of precedent. The resulting debate between the Justices would focus entirely
upon the 10% in dispute. A study of the content of the debate could
misleadingly ignore the 90% agreed upon and overemphasize the unsettled 10%. Justice Stevens concedes that the Court may ignore or
disrespect precedent on occasion but emphasizes that the

133. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 109, at 8 (noting the tendency to conflate policymaking and interpretation when the two are conceptually different).
134. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838, 839 (1998) (deferring to a
congressional policy decision limiting waivers of age discrimination act claims); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2133 (1997) (respecting the policy judgment of
Congress in favor of imposing assessments to pay for collaborative agricultural advertising);
Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1927 (1997) (deferring to the legislative policy underlying
a redistricting plan).
135. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 28.
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“framework for most Court opinions is created by previously decided
cases.”136
In fairness to the authors, I must concede that they present substantial evidence that the Justices are motivated by ideological policy
goals. Other internal reports on the Court support this view,137 as do
occasional concessions by the Justices themselves.138 There is also
considerable empirical evidence supporting the attitudinal model.139
There is an important difference, though, between caring about policy ends and caring only about policy ends. Epstein and Knight have
not demonstrated that the latter is the case.
B. Oversimplification of Judicial Behavior
Epstein and Knight’s one-dimensional vision of judicial objectives is consistent with that of many political scientists. The limited
view of judicial behavior may simply be characteristic of particular
disciplines. Just as the currency of economists is currency, the currencies of political scientists are political power and policy. Just as
economists may try to monetize every value, political scientists may
reduce every issue to politics and legal scholars may reduce every decision to the dictates of law. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, none
of these rather narrow perspectives promises to capture much of the
complex reality of judicial decisionmaking.
In defense of Epstein and Knight, they are presenting an initial
model, which almost by definition means an incomplete simplifica-

136. John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4
(1983).
137. See sources cited supra note 15.
138. Chief Justice Earl Warren declared in his memoirs that neutral legal principles were
merely a “fantasy.” EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 333 (1977). Justice
Harlan, described by Justice Brennan as the “only real judge” on the Court, WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 263 (failing to identify the origin of Justice Brennan’s statement), nevertheless once declared that “if we [Justices] don’t like an act of Congress, we don’t
have much trouble to find grounds for declaring it unconstitutional.” ALPHEUS T. MASO, THE
SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN vii (1958) (quoting Harlan from a talk given to law
students).
139. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at xii n.b (citing Segal et al., Ideological Values
and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995); SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 29); id. at 57 n.a (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29). However, Epstein and Knight’s strategic account cannot rely too heavily upon these results. If Justices do
consistently vote their ideological preferences, that fact minimizes the impact of Court strategies. It suggests that Justices don’t worry much about the preferences of other institutions, such
as Congress.
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tion.140 The authors seek not to explain everything but to present a
model that can be used to explain and predict central trends in decisions. Of course, the best models are those with the most explanatory
power. While models are necessarily oversimplifications, the simplest
model is not necessarily the best. The model presented in Choices requires some refinement and elaboration to account for the role of the
law in judicial decisionmaking.
There is reason to believe that the law matters considerably.
Some Justices may abide by the law simply because it is their duty.141
Walter Murphy was no naive formalist, but he recognized the potential call of duty and referred to this prospect as “oughtness.”142 The
elemental concept of doing what one ought to do can be elaborated
through a theory of role orientation. The judicial role may drive Justices to respect the law itself.143 If the concept of duty seems too pious
for social science, consider the economic evidence that finds preferences to be affected by emotions, including guilt and shame.144 Even
the archetypal, hypothetical maximizing homo economicus acts
“according to certain moral values (e.g., rule-abiding attitudes, esprit
de corps, class solidarity, pride in workmanship, generalized altruism).”145
140. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Studying Law and Courts, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 1, 7-8
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (noting that models “are not meant to constitute reality” but “are purposefully designed to ignore certain aspects of the real world and focus instead on a crucial set
of explanatory factors”).
141. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 109, at 10 (“If judges think policy making is wrong,
they may actually desist from doing it.”); id. at 209 (“Judges, after all, are conscious beings, and
they must have had some means of justifying their decisions to themselves, some conceptual
process that assimilated their decisions to their existing understanding of their role.”); Kozinski, supra note 68, at 72 (referring to the legal realist position as “horse manure” and contending that judges are constrained by the law and their sense of self-respect); id. at 74 (suggesting
that even a vague standard like unreasonability provides “a meaningful constraint for the large
majority of cases”).
142. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 39.
143. See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1989, 2026 (1996) (“[J]udges are likely to take the rule of law quite seriously. It is part of their
set of role expectations–their institutionally induced beliefs about the way they should carry out
their official functions.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 120 (1992) (“Most judges hold deeply internalized role constraints and
believe that judgment is not politics.”). When academics are appointed to the bench, their
opinions have been less ideological than were their scholarly writings. See DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 89-90 (1991) (contrasting the opinions and
writings of Antonin Scalia and Frank Easterbrook).
144. See Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 47 (1998).
145. Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
703, 722 (1997).

CROSS TO PRINTER MARCH 12 1999

540

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

03/13/99 9:56 PM

[Vol. 48:511

It is also possible that judges care about and gain utility from legal policy, as well as public policy. Justices are trained in the law, at
schools largely devoted to traditional legal analysis. Like many professors of law, judges may sincerely care about the politically neutral
state of the law.146 Perhaps it “pleases judges to carry out what they
perceive as the judge’s role.”147 Considerable empirical research supports the ideological, realist view of judging at the Court, but these
studies typically have not even considered the possibility of an explanatory legal variable. Introducing such a variable can be difficult,
but some political scientists have defined methodologies that include
precedent and have found that precedent can indeed be a significant
determinant of the Court’s decisionmaking.148 Even those legal researchers that admit to a substantial political influence on judicial decisionmaking also believe that “craft,” or reasoning, or concern with
reputation influences judges to decide cases according to legal factors.149
A somewhat less noble but potentially powerful reason for deferring to precedent is leisure-seeking. Judge Posner has observed
that stare decisis is an efficient approach for reducing the time and
effort necessary to decide cases.150 Pursuit of leisure would explain the
Justices’ increasing delegation of responsibilities to clerks and other
contemporary Court practices.151 Justice Stevens himself has conceded that precedent provides “special benefits” to judges, such as

146. See Cross, supra note 3, at 299-300.
147. BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 61.
148. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Bringing the Law Back In: Finding a Role of Law in
Models of Supreme Court Decision-Making (April 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Kritzer and his colleagues found that the Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the government may not proscribe the advocacy of illegal action
unless the advocacy is aimed at producing or inciting imminent lawless action, and is likely to
succeed) had a significant effect on subsequent Court decisions. See id. at 21; see also Tracey E.
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 323 (1992) (finding that legal doctrine constrained the attitudinal preferences of Justices
in death penalty cases); Wahlbeck, supra note 83, at 794 (finding that the quantity of relevant
existing precedent significantly reduced the prospect of attitudinally based change in precedent).
149. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51
SMU L. REV. 469 (1998); Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44
DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
150. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 141 (1995).
151. See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 44-47; SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 50.
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making “their work easier.”152 Justices sometimes even join opinions
with which they disagree, simply to avoid writing a dissent.153 The
pursuit of leisure surely strengthens judicial inclinations to recognize
stare decisis.
Further evidence of the importance of precedent in legal decisionmaking comes from a variety of sources. In The Brethren, Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong acknowledge a material role for
precedent, reporting that Chief Justice Burger’s efforts to undo certain Warren Court opinions ran afoul of the power of precedent.
Woodward and Armstrong observed that “the Chief found that his
conservative colleagues, with their concern with precedent, caused
him as much difficulty as the liberals.”154 Another prominent political
scientist, Lawrence Baum, believes that the judicial maxim consists of
both policy preferences and “legal accuracy.”155 Even Epstein and
Knight admit that Justices frequently discuss precedent at conferences.156
At a minimum, precedent creates some stickiness and temporal
consistency in the law. Precedents are overruled occasionally but not
often. Epstein and Knight themselves have previously observed that
“[e]ven though the Court’s propensity to alter precedents has increased over the past couple of decades, the percentages remain minute.”157 Presidents Reagan and Bush were dedicated to overturning
major Warren Court doctrines, as well as liberal Burger Court decisions such as Roe v. Wade.158 They sought to appoint Justices and
Chief Justices similarly dedicated. Yet the politically objectionable
precedents have largely survived.159
152. Stevens, supra note 136, at 2.
153. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 56.
154. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 76. This is illustrated by Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that denying a person counsel during a preliminary hearing violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause), a case in which Justice Harlan’s
dedication to a liberal criminal rights precedent caused a reversal in the Court’s opinion.
155. BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 65 (arguing that the objective of accuracy constrains
a bias for politically preferred outcomes “because decision makers want to reach results that
they can accept as correct”).
156. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 28-31.
157. Knight & Epstein, supra note 116, at 1031.
158. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 11 (suggesting that Reagan and Bush sought to “reverse
the liberal legacy of the Warren Court and its successor, the Burger Court,” and had the
“numbers” to expect that they would be successful).
159. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 152 (observing that “no important Warren Court
decision was overruled during the Burger tenure”). The more conservative Courts have surely
trimmed controversial doctrines such as the exclusionary rule and abortion rights. But the fun-
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Another problem with the authors’ exclusive focus on policy
concerns is the inability of their perspective to shed light on the large
number of Court cases that do not have a clear ideological implications or that are politically insignificant. The Court regularly hears
cases that lack ideological or political import.160 Choices might cause
one to think that the Justices would be at a complete loss to resolve
such cases. In reality, of course, the Court concerns itself with other
ends and resolves the nonpolitical cases accordingly.161 If the Justices
place some value on nonideological objectives in resolving these
nonideological cases, it is none too difficult to believe that those objectives might likewise carry at least some value in resolving more
political cases. The mere fact that the Court grants certiorari to review such nonideological cases demonstrates the power of legal concerns.
For an example of the limits of the ideological, strategic vision of
the Court, consider the recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,162
striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).163 The Act was passed to strengthen the right to the free exercise of religion, which the Court had recently limited in Employ164
ment Division v. Smith. RFRA was popular among both conservatives and liberals in Congress.165 Here was a law without a strong
political component, about which Congress plainly cared a great deal.
The strategic model suggests that the Court should have upheld the
law. The Court should have found it ideologically acceptable, as the
Justices’ politics are presumed to track those of the other branches.
In any event, the Court should have upheld the Act to avoid a fight
with Congress over a nonideological matter. Yet the Court struck

damental principles remain. This is precisely the result one would expect from Justices who are
concerned about both ideology and precedent. Nor has the Rehnquist Court reversed most of
the precedents that the conservatives found objectionable. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 11
(describing the Rehnquist era as a “conservative judicial revolution that failed”).
160. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
161. For example, “Supreme Court justices undoubtedly have trouble superimposing an
ideological framework on boundary disputes between states: the Island Exception to the Rule
of the Thalweg, for example, is not easily classified as a liberal or a conservative doctrine
(Louisiana v. Mississippi 1995).” BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 66.
162. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
164. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 (1994) (describing enormous bipartisan support for the legislation).
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down the law. The apparent reason was that the Court genuinely
cared about the legal issues.
Two political scientists, C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp, have
sought to integrate the legal and attitudinal models, using the federal
district courts as a basis for their study.166 They believe that judges are
dedicated to sincere and formal legal decisionmaking but that their
decisions may nonetheless be somewhat political due to the judges’
subconscious heuristics. Judges use “cognitive shortcuts to process
imperfect information,” and these shortcuts are influenced by their
political perspective.167 A judge’s ideology thus influences her
“evaluation of information” more than her motives.168 On this view,
politics may still be functionally quite significant but not paramount;
close investigation of cases may override a judge’s ideological cues.
Two law professors, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, reject
the argument about the effect of the judicial subconscious but emphasize the role of law in judicial behavior.169 They contend that
judges sometimes base decisions “on their own best efforts to understand an authoritative text” but also sometimes decide on the basis of
“their sense of the best public policy.”170 While Feeley and Rubin do
not try to provide a comprehensive explanation of when judges are
policymakers, they emphasize that Congress sometimes requires such
policymaking by leaving gaps in a statutory framework. Feeley and
Rubin also observe that judges may become policymakers to address
a practice that violates “a widely held principle of social morality”171
but that has not been addressed by the accountable branches. Regardless, when judges become policymakers, Feeley and Rubin argue,
they remain constrained by doctrine and other institutions.172 They

166. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1996).
167. Id. at 171. These cognitive shortcuts may relate to the facts—a liberal Justice may view
minorities arguing for affirmative action as historic victims of discrimination while a conservative Justice may view the same parties as special pleaders seeking legal favoritism. The shortcuts may also relate to the law. Justices presumably have their “favorite” precedents, with
which they are most familiar.
168. Id. at 164.
169. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 109, at 11.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 161.
172. See id. at 209 (noting that judges are constrained even when creating new doctrine).
Feeley and Rubin emphasize that the ability of any individual judge or court to create new doctrine or policy is significantly constrained by the need to coordinate their decisionmaking with
other courts. See id. at 226-33.
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argue that a judge’s “need to maintain contact with existing doctrine,
to stretch it without snapping it, is one of several conditions for effective judicial policy making.”173
A more complex vision, in which Justices care independently
about the law, is actually more consistent with Epstein and Knight’s
focus on judicial strategies. If public policy was the sole objective of
each Justice, there wouldn’t be much room for strategizing—judicial
policy positions would be determined, presumably known by the
other Justices, and hard to move. Once legal policy enters the equation, strategizing becomes more complex and promising. A Justice
may assess the relative significance of his or her own legal and public
policy values and those of others. The Justice can then lobby other
Justices on the set of values to which they are most susceptible and
put together an opinion package that bows to the wishes of others. A
Justice who cares particularly about a given legal policy may sacrifice
some public policy value, and vice versa.
Epstein and Knight ultimately concede that law may sometimes
restrain the results reached by the Court. The Justices may
“strategically modify their position to take account of a normative
constraint—such as stare decisis—to produce a decision as close as
possible to their preferred outcome.”174 Even here, though, the
authors refuse to concede that matters of principle or responsibility
might motivate the Justices. Rather, they claim that respect for
precedent is simply a tool for strategically effecting policy goals.175
Precedent, Epstein and Knight argue, may become important as part
of the “external strategic dimension” for the Court.176 Society’s willingness to accept the Court’s authority may hinge on the perception
that Justices are constrained by the law and precedent. 177 Justices
therefore may adhere to the law in order to protect their institutional
position. The authors suggest that the Justices will generally adhere
to precedent for institutional reasons but depart from precedent occasionally in individual cases when they have a particularly strong
policy preference.178 The result is a norm of stare decisis that does not
173. Id. at 355.
174. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 45.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 164.
177. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 137, 137-38 (1994) (describing the pervasiveness of the belief that the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy derives from the view that its decisions are “dictated by law”).
178. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 164-65.
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universally control decisions and opinions but does influence them in
many cases.179
Epstein and Knight’s theory of the external strategic basis for
precedent is supported by some other evidence of Court policy, such
as Supreme Court Rule 58. This Rule dictates that the Court will
grant rehearing of a decided case only if one of the Justices in the
original majority moves for reconsideration.180 This means that the
Justices will not quickly reverse themselves based entirely on a
change in the Court’s ideological composition.181 Rule 58 thus protects the Court from appearing too politically oriented. Some members of the Court went even further than this Rule in the wake of the
dramatic and rapid ideological transition from the Warren Court to
the Burger Court. Justice Stewart had an unwritten rule not to join
Nixon-appointed Justices as the fifth vote in favor of overruling a
Warren Court precedent, even if he had dissented in the earlier
case.182 This recognition of the importance of appearances is sometimes even explicitly conceded. Justice Stevens declared that adherence to stare decisis strengthens the perception that Judges are administering justice impartially, which “obviously enhances the
institutional strength of the judiciary.”183 In discussing Patterson v.
184
McLean Credit Union, Justice Scalia reportedly said that “Runyon
was wrong . . . but public reaction [to the threat of overruling it] is
appropriate and I would not overrule.”185 Justices have even conceded
in a written opinion that adherence to stare decisis is necessary so as

179. See id. at 177.
180. See SUP. CT. R. 58.
181. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(stating that a “basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of Government” and that “[n]o misconception could do more lasting injury to this
Court”).
182. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 482.
183. Stevens, supra note 136, at 2. Justice Goldberg earlier made a similar point. See
ARTHUR GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 75 (1971) ( “[S]tare decisis foster[s] public confidence in
the judiciary and public acceptance of individual decisions by giving the appearance of impersonal, consistent, and reasoned opinions.”).
184. 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that the prohibition against racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of contracts, embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), only applied to
contract formation).
185. SIMON, supra note 15, at 47 (failing to identify the source of this statement). Of course,
Scalia took this position only after it became clear that there was no majority to overrule Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts).
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not “to weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power”
and maintain its “legitimacy.”186 External strategy does appear to explain some adherence to precedent.187
Although Epstein and Knight finally conclude that precedent
does have some importance, they insist that its significance is entirely
attributable to external strategy, not sincerity. This is essentially a
preempirical matter; it would be extremely difficult to test whether
adherence to precedent was sincere or strategic. The best guide is
probably the internal, “behind-the-scenes” evidence. I think this evidence suggests that Justices sincerely care about both policy and
precedent. But perhaps the motivation does not matter. Even if stare
decisis is a product of nothing more than leisure-seeking and political
strategy, the doctrine of adherence to precedent has substantial practical importance.
Nothing in the concept of judicial strategy requires the assumption that Justices are exclusive maximizers of their policy preferences, which Epstein and Knight have themselves recognized in the
past.188 Justices might be concerned with both legal principles (such as
respect for precedent or text) and policy objectives. Epstein and
Knight’s fundamental strategic thesis is not contingent on the presumption that Justices are concerned only with policy. Rational
choice analysis can apply where the actors pursue multiple goals;
studies of Congress have been based on an assumption that the representatives pursue both ideological and electoral objectives.189 The
authors’ presumption of a lexicographic preference system (where

186. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
187. There is a general belief that Justices must appear to follow the law in order to protect
their legitimacy, yet this belief is largely undemonstrated. Actual research suggests that the institutional legitimacy of national high courts is related in part to the people’s policy satisfaction
with the court’s decisions. See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High
Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 354 (1998). Gibson and his colleagues also found, though,
that courts benefit from their ability to cast unpopular decisions as compelled by the law, shifting responsibility to other entities such as the legislature. As a result, a court can gain credit for
favored decisions and escape accountability for disfavored ones. See id. at 357.
188. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Documenting Strategic Interaction on the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 n.16 (1995) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, on file with author) (noting that researchers typically
assume that judges are “single minded seekers of policy” but conceding that this “need not be
the case”).
189. See, e.g., David Austen-Smith, Explaining the Vote: Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated Voting, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 68, 70-71 (1992); Arthur Denzau et al., Farquharson and
Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1117, 1118 (1985).
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one good is so preferred that it is consumed exclusively and tradeoffs
are not made) simplifies modeling and the empirical testing of hypotheses. Such reductionism is unrealistic and unnecessarily undermines the credibility of the book. Far more plausible is the position
that judges are concerned with a variety of ends, including ideological
policy.190 Presumably they exercise strategy in pursuit of those ends.
Walter Murphy suggested that rulings are “a medley of legal principle, personal preferences, and educated guesses as to what is best for
society.”191 The following Part presents some outstanding questions,
answers to which may provide more sophisticated insights into the
Justices’ strategies.
IV. INTRIGUING QUESTIONS OUTSTANDING
While I have criticized some aspects of The Choices Justices
Make, I wish to point out that Epstein and Knight have done a great
amount of research and have advanced the ball considerably in the
study of strategic Supreme Court decisionmaking. Notwithstanding
the amount of research they present, however, many questions remain unanswered. The authors note that the rational choice approach
“seeks to explain all the choices justices make—from the initial decision to grant review to the policy enunciated in the final opinion.”192
They do not personally claim to have completed this explanation. Future research, some of it undoubtedly to be done by Epstein and
Knight themselves, promises greater understanding of judicial strategy. The participation of law professors would surely enhance this
understanding.

190. See Edelman & Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice, supra note 24, at 97 (“The question of voting power at the margins of complex, multifaceted legal issues is independent of any
particular Justice’s ideology.”). This contrary claim seems far too extreme—ideology obviously
matters a lot. But it is not the only thing that matters. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 109, at
213 (arguing that “both [legal and political] factors are at work and it would be more productive to explore their interaction than to choose between them”); Edelman & Chen, “Duel”
Diligence, supra note 50, at 232 (arguing that ample scholarship demonstrates that Justices’
preferences are not “single-peaked in a single dimension”).
191. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 17.
192. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at xiv.
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A. Why Do Justices Value Majority Opinions?
There is an old saying at the Supreme Court that “five votes can
do anything around here.”193 Indeed, Epstein and Knight’s analysis of
strategy within the Court places central importance on obtaining a
majority opinion. At first blush, the reason for this seems obvious—
only a majority opinion carries the formal legal weight of the Court.
A closer look, however, gives reason to question the authors’ reasoning. The principle that a plurality opinion expresses no law rests
only on a legal rule. Epstein and Knight, realists when it comes to explaining substantive judicial decisionmaking, become naive formalists
in accepting this legal rule. A more realist perspective calls this acceptance into question.
When nine Justices are sitting, all decisions are majority decisions, as the Court is confronted with only binary options. It must affirm or reverse, deciding for either appellant or appellee. Even with
nine separate opinions, there is only one result.
A majority decision, though, is not the same as a majority opinion. To obtain a majority opinion requires such compromise as is
necessary to get five votes, giving the fifth or median Justice considerable control over the opinion’s language. This practice could produce a considerable moderation of the opinion’s language, something
experienced by Justice Brennan and others in Craig v. Boren.194 In the
event that a group of Justices does not moderate its proposed opinion
to get a fifth vote, presumably the median Justice would file a special
concurring opinion expressing his or her more moderate views. In
this scenario, while the more extreme plurality opinion would have
only four supporting votes, it would still form the basis for a majority
decision. Epstein and Knight suggest that this result yields no binding
precedent, but this view is overly formalist.
Holmes famously declared that the law consisted not of opinions’ ratio decendi but of “prophecies” of what the courts will do.195 A
majority opinion is not required for lower courts or others to make
such predictions. A rational lower court, for example, will simply find
the position of the fifth Justice and treat this as the law. Even the Su-

193. This statement is most closely associated with Justice Brennan. See SIMON, supra note
15, at 54; LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 369.
194. The decision in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), is detailed supra in the text accompanying notes 36-40.
195. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
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preme Court has suggested use of this practice,196 which has in fact
been followed by lower courts.197 It should hardly matter whether the
fifth Justice’s opinion is found in the majority opinion or in a concurrence. The majority coalition of four has no reason to seek the fifth
vote, unless the fifth Justice is willing to compromise his or her position. And a concurring fifth Justice has no reason to compromise his
or her position, as his or her lone concurrence would serve to functionally define the law.198
Given the ability of the fifth Justice to define the law regardless
of whether a majority opinion exists, why are majority opinions
commonly produced? There are many possible reasons, most of
which reflect the Court’s external environment. First, there is clearly
a norm in favor of reaching a majority opinion.199 Majority opinions
may be necessary to preserve societal respect for the Court.200 Second,

196. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169
n.15 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion))).
197. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 459 (describing how a Third Circuit decision assumed that the Supreme Court abortion policy corresponded to the position of the perceived
fifth Justice); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential
Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 433-34 (1992) (“Lower courts
have consistently treated Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in [Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)] as the holding of the Court.”).
198. There may be some vanity benefit to authoring a majority opinion of the Court, as
such an opinion generally would get more attention from the press and from law reviews. See
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 63 (reporting that Chief Justice Burger believed that “concurrences detracted from the main opinion and were, in some cases, almost an
insult to the author assigned for the majority”). But on Epstein and Knight’s unidimensional
scale of ideological preferences and rational choice decisionmaking, I can find no benefit to the
fifth Justice joining a majority.
199. See Saul Brenner & Robert H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the
United States Supreme Court: A Theoretical Perspective, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 195, 198-200
(1992) (reporting that Justices shift from the minority in order to create a greater Court consensus); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1993) (finding it the “norm for judges to sacrifice
details of their convictions in the service of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to
the court”). The most remarkable testimony to this effect can be found in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 674 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (declaring that he favored an affirmance but agreeing to a judgment vacating the
FCC decision because otherwise “no disposition of this appeal would command the support of
a majority of the Court”).
200. See Douglas J. Whaley, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial
Decisions 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 371 (1968) (contending that the presence of plurality decisions
represents a “breakdown in the judicial system”); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Deci-

CROSS TO PRINTER MARCH 12 1999

550

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

03/13/99 9:56 PM

[Vol. 48:511

there may be some value in being a member of a majority.201 Justice
O’Connor, for example, seems to place some value on Justices being
accommodating in producing a majority opinion.202 Third, the existence of plurality opinions may invite revisitation by the Court.203 Finally, there seems to be some vanity value to authoring a majority
opinion. The majority may be able to elicit compromise from the fifth
Justice in exchange for permitting him or her to write the opinion.
However, the best strategic reason for producing a majority
opinion may be the room that a plurality opinion leaves for interpretive incompetence or clever disobedience by the lower courts.204
Lower courts may be unable to identify the position taken by the fifth
Justice and therefore may interpret the rule incorrectly. Alternatively, a lower court may adopt the rule produced by the largest plurality (usually four Justices), even if this coalition clearly does not
contain the fifth Justice.205 These decisions may be erroneous, but
they might also reflect shrewd strategy by lower courts that seek to
pour their own preferences into the plurality opinion’s vessel.
Moreover, the first lower court to address the issue has an opportunity to define the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion, a definition
which may be followed by subsequent lower court decisions.206 The
Supreme Court’s loss of control over the doctrinal application of plurality opinions may help to explain the true value of majority opinions.
Assuming that Justices do value majority opinions, a trickier
question is why some cases fail to produce a majority opinion, leaving
sionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (describing such opinions as a “failure to fulfill the
Court’s obligations”).
201. See Brenner & Dorff, supra note 199, at 198-200.
202. See Edelman & Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice, supra note 24, at 65; David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6 (magazine) at 65, 69 (quoting a former
Rehnquist clerk as saying that Justice O’Connor is “very willing to build consensus on opinions”).
203. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (suggesting that when the Court
is “splintered,” that fact gives “a reason for reexamining that decision”).
204. See John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the
Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 71 (arguing that plurality decisions create confusion in the
lower courts). One such example is King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (noting that the court of appeals was unable to ascertain “narrowest ground” among the
Justices after the Court’s plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), because Justice O’Connor’s concurrence seemed too inconsistent with the theory of the main plurality opinion).
205. See Thurmon, supra note 197, at 448 (reporting that, historically, lower courts took the
largest plurality opinion as authoritative).
206. See id. at 419.
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plurality opinions to define the law. Plurality opinions are not uncommon207 and can be found in some of the Court’s most important
decisions.208 If Justices decided all cases on a linear range of political
preferences, as Epstein and Knight claim, a majority could always be
achieved by shifting the opinion to the preferred political position of
the fifth Justice. Why then do plurality opinions exist in important
cases?
Once Epstein and Knight’s unidimensional ideological scaling is
abandoned, plurality opinions become more interesting and complicated. If Justices are assumed to care about the law, merely shifting
the opinion to the policy preference of the fifth Justice would not
necessarily produce a majority. The prospective majority would also
have to conform to the legal preference of the fifth Justice without
losing the votes of others in the coalition.209 The fifth Justice on the
policy dimension might be different from the fifth Justice on the legal
dimension. Compromises necessary to creating a policy majority
might incidentally destroy the legal majority. This is the more complicated strategic bargaining situation that commonly confronts the
Court.
210
Craig v. Boren is used by Epstein and Knight as an example of
strategy within the Court.211 The case implicates both policy issues
(the type of review to be used in gender discrimination cases) and legal issues of standing.212 Craig is a convincing illustration of how Jus207. In the 1970s, the Court issued 88 plurality opinions. See Note, supra note 200, at 1127
n.1 (1981); see also Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1593 (1992) (reporting a “dramatic increase in the use of plurality decisions”).
208. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (issuing a plurality
opinion on a Fourteenth Amendment case); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (issuing a plurality opinion on a major civil rights case); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (issuing an opinion on a campaign finance matter with separate concurrences and dissents by six of the nine Justices); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (issuing nine separate
opinions on a death penalty case); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (same); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (issuing a per curiam opinion with nine separate
detailed opinions).
209. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at 64-67 (discussing Justice Brennan’s struggle to craft
an effective strategy in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), without alienating the three Justices already on his side); id. at 133-36 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
effort in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), to attract the moderate
conservatives on abortion rights without losing Justices White and Scalia).
210. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
211. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 1-13.
212. Indeed, Craig first articulated the intermediate standard of review. See Craig, 429 U.S.
at 208-09; see also supra notes 36-40 (discussing Craig in greater detail).
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tice Brennan compromised his desire for a strict scrutiny standard for
gender discrimination in order to command a majority. A few years
earlier, in Frontiero v. Richardson,213 Justice Brennan confronted exactly the same issue. That time, however, he insisted upon the strict
scrutiny standard for gender discrimination and authored a plurality
opinion214 after rejecting a compromise with Justice Stewart that
would have softened the opinion but produced a majority.215 Why did
Brennan choose to compromise in Craig and yet reject the same
compromise three years earlier in Frontiero? Epstein and Knight’s
strategic model fails to provide an answer to this question.
In fact, a plurality opinion may itself have considerable practical
significance, regardless of the position of the fifth Justice. The internal debate in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union216 offers an interesting illustration. A five-member conservative majority could not agree
on an opinion for the defendant company, while Justice Brennan
commanded a four-Justice dissent. He switched his result to favor the
defendant in an attempt to present the lead plurality opinion, which
he obviously considered significant, but wrote an expansive interpretation of the law.217 The conservative Justices apparently agreed that a
lead plurality carries substantial practical significance, because they
promptly joined forces in order to produce a majority opinion.218 It is
unclear why the largest plurality, rather than the fifth Justice’s position, should have legal significance. Obviously, though, the Justices
believe that the lead plurality opinion is of practical significance.
The decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
219
American Petroleum Institute (Benzene) demonstrates the significance of a plurality opinion and simultaneously shows how a linear
ideological preference alignment is an oversimplified presentation of
the Justices’ positions. Benzene involved the legal authority of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to regulate

213. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
214. See id. at 688 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
215. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 302-03. According to this account,
Justice Stewart favored the tougher standard but believed that it would eventually result from
the then-pending Equal Rights Amendment. He offered to accept Brennan’s standard in a later
case, but Brennan rejected the offer as a “deal.” See id.
216. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
217. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 316-17; SIMON, supra note 15, at 64-67.
218. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 317-18.
219. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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carcinogens in the workplace.220 The appeal presented three choices: a
highly deferential standard (the liberal position), a cost-benefit requirement (the most conservative position), or a requirement that the
agency establish the presence of a significant risk before regulating (a
moderately conservative position). Justices Marshall, Brennan,
White, and Blackmun adopted the liberal position.221 Justice Stevens,
joined in part by Justices Burger, Stewart and Powell, wrote a plurality opinion striking down the OSHA regulation using the moderately
conservative position.222 Justice Powell also wrote a concurrence arguing for the more conservative cost-benefit standard.223 Justice
Rehnquist wrote a special concurrence, taking an even more conservative position than that which was presented to the Court, holding
that the statutory grant of power to OSHA was standardless and in
violation of the delegation doctrine.224
The Benzene opinions appear to have been ideologically driven,
but they were certainly not strategic under Epstein and Knight’s theory. Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to compromise cost the conservatives
a majority opinion. Additionally, Rehnquist certainly did not hold
the swing vote on the ideological spectrum. Yet the Benzene plurality
opinion, one of the most important public health rulings ever to
emerge from the Court, has been treated as legally binding and has
been readily applied by lower courts and agencies.225 One might presume that Rehnquist saw that no compromise was needed, and thus
chose instead to express his sincere opinion while remaining confident that the moderately conservative plurality rule would nonetheless prevail in future cases.

220. See id. at 611.
221. See id. at 689-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 662 (Burger, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring).
224. See id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. Benzene functionally required agencies to conduct quantitative risk assessments and
establish that a risk was significant before regulating. See id. at 639. The “significant risk” standard produced a major transformation in rulemaking for OSHA and beyond, especially for carcinogens. See Frank B. Cross et al., Discernible Risk—A Proposed Standard for Significant Risk
in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 68-70 (1991) (stating that the Benzene decision “established a potentially broad foundation for using a significant risk test throughout federal regulation of carcinogens and other hazardous substances”).
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B. Why Aren’t All Decisions 5-4?
In the basic strategic model, the fifth Justice holds most of the
power. The less moderate first four votes must compromise for the
fifth vote. Once they get that vote, they have a majority opinion declaring the law of the land. Gaining a sixth, seventh, eighth, or ninth
vote would require greater compromise in the opinion. Given that
five votes are all that is required for controlling legal authority, what
incentive is there for Justices already in the majority to compromise
further? This is an application of Riker’s size principle, which suggests that winning legislative coalitions will be of the minimal size
necessary.226 It is said that “the only time that an individual Justice’s
vote matters is when he is in a coalition of exactly five Justices.”227
Edward Lazarus confirms that an opinion author’s willingness to
compromise “depends mainly on how close a case it is, in other
words, how badly the author needs the other Justice to join in order
to obtain or preserve a majority.”228 Logically, then, it would seem
that 5-4 decisions would be the rule. Yet “winning coalitions of ex229
actly five Justices are the great exception rather than the rule.”
The reason for the existence of majority coalitions greater than
five presumably lies in the greater effective power or influence of a
decision backed by more Justices. It is well-known that the Court especially values a unanimous opinion in certain controversial cases,
the perception being that unanimity offers a more compelling force.230
Unanimity was considered essential to Brown v. Board of Educa231
232
tion and the series of civil rights decisions that followed. The Justices believed that unanimity would reduce resistance by lower courts
and other institutions. Other major cases, such as the Nixon tapes
case,233 were unanimous for similar reasons.234 Unanimity makes a de226. See RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 11, at 177.
227. Edelman & Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice, supra note 24, at 66.
228. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 25.
229. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence, supra note 50, at 193.
230. See ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 30, at 200-03 (discussing the importance of producing a unanimous opinion “in situations where there is a threat to the Court’s authority”).
231. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
232. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 694-99 (1977) (reporting that in Brown, Chief
Justice Warren “wished to avoid concurring opinions; the fewer voices with which the Court
spoke, the better”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 92-100 (describing Chief Justice Warren’s
efforts to obtain a unanimous opinion in Brown); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15,
at 41 (observing that “the Justices had agreed that it was essential to let the South know that
not a single Justice believed in anything less than full desegregation”).
233. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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cision look apolitical and driven by neutral legal principles.235 Unanimity may also reduce the risk of congressional reversal.236 Perhaps
opinions with relatively larger majorities of six, seven, or eight votes
are also more powerful than a minimum 5-4 majority opinion.237 This
point is illustrated by a letter from Justice Scalia to Justice White, after the latter had rejected changes suggested by the former; Scalia’s
letter nevertheless expressed a willingness to join the opinion because “four votes are even more clearly better than one than they are
better than three.”238
If larger majorities produce stronger law, every vote necessarily
has some value. Walter Murphy suggests that “a 5-4 decision emphasizes the strength of the losing side and may encourage resistance and
evasion” and conversely that “the greater the majority, the greater
the appearance of certainty and the more likely a decision will be accepted and followed in similar cases.”239 One study found that a larger
majority makes it less likely that the Court will later overturn the
precedent.240 If this explanation is true, the Justices in the majority
must weigh the increased power of a larger majority against the
measure of compromise required for additional votes. The Justices in

234. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 337-412. A unanimous single
opinion was reportedly considered “the greatest deterrent to a defiant President.” Id. at 366.
While Chief Justice Burger was the formal author of the opinion, he made substantial concessions to achieve a unanimous single opinion. See id. at 405-07; see also Charles M. Lamb & Lisa
K. Parshall, United States v. Nixon Revisited: A Case Study in Supreme Court Decision-Making,
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 71, 108 (1996) (stating that if the decision had not been unanimous, it
might have given “President Nixon a reason to consider noncompliance”).
235. Rohde and Spaeth have compared the size of Supreme Court majority coalitions in
cases when there was an external threat to the Court’s jurisdiction or authority with the size of
majorities other cases. They found that eight- and nine-vote majority opinions were much more
common in threat situations. See ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 30, at 199.
236. See Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 447 (1983); Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern
Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493, 495 (1989).
237. Chief Justice Warren reportedly wanted every vote he could get for his majority in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 109 (describing
Warren’s efforts to keep Brennan from writing a separate concurrence). See generally Thurmon, supra note 197, at 449 (reporting that the “traditional view” was “that an opinion’s precedential authority is directly proportional to the number of Justices that join it”).
238. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 59 (quoting a letter from Justice Scalia to Justice White
(Dec. 21, 1988)). But see Edelman & Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice, supra note 24, at 75
(noting that dissents seldom command four votes but tend to fracture once a majority is unattainable).
239. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 66.
240. See Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 92, at 22. The authors found that each additional
concurrence increased the risk of future overturn by 18.8%. See id.
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the minority should be making a similar evaluation of the compromises they might extract from the majority.
If majority opinions do have special legal significance, the fifth
Justice would have relatively more power than the sixth, seventh, etc.
All the latter Justices have to trade is an amorphous loss of influence
for the majority opinion. Consequently, they can command far less
compromise in the majority opinion. In some special cases with a
unanimity norm, though, even the ninth Justice can wield considerable influence.241 Of course, every Justice could potentially become
the ninth Justice with a threatened dissent or special concurrence on
any basis, liberal or conservative. Thus, no particular Justice or position is necessarily empowered by a unanimity norm.
A bandwagoning factor may also help produce majority opinions
of more than five. Once a Justice’s side has lost, he cannot effect his
policies in the decision. Writing a dissent may take considerable time
and effort, without any guarantee of direct impact.242 It is far easier to
concede one’s argument and join the majority. Moreover, some Justices may simply “like to win (or to be perceived as ‘winners’).”243 Justices may also go along with the majority opinion for collegial reasons.244 These psychological factors cannot generally explain large
majorities, however. The contemporary numerosity of dissents
clearly demonstrates that Justices do not readily join a majority with
which they differ. So we are left with the enhanced influence of supermajority opinions as an explanation for their existence.
While the above analysis of bargaining for more than five votes
to gain import for an opinion has logical appeal, it is largely unsupported empirically.245 The analysis is also vague. Does a larger major241. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 44-59 (describing Justice Black’s
ability to drive the terms of the Court’s decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Board, 396
U.S. 19 (1969) (holding that segregated schools must integrate immediately), by threatening to
dissent from a decision permitting any further delay in desegregation). Such a strategy may
work only once, however. When Black tried the same approach the next year in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (establishing a presumption
against racially identifiable schools once past state discrimination has been shown, thus forcing
the school district to show that the current segregation was not caused by past intentional discrimination), the other Justices were annoyed and called his bluff. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 126-27. Black’s interest in unanimity caused him to back off his
threatened dissent. See id. at 127.
242. See Cross, supra note 3, at 305-06.
243. George, supra note 3, at 1661.
244. See generally Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 199.
245. See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 83, at 21. Epstein and Segal have found some support for the hypothesis that larger majorities have greater political power in the external envi-
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ity influence the lower courts, Congress, the public, or all of the
above? Research is needed to reveal whether larger majorities do in
fact command greater adherence and within what audience. Moreover, the whole theory may be invalid—even the unanimous civil
rights opinions were disobeyed by lower courts and had an uncertain
societal impact.246 If the facially obvious theory is invalid, then why
aren’t all decisions 5-4? Perhaps too many 5-4 opinions would make
the Court appear too political and less like a legal institution.247 The
potentially dissenting Justices may compromise their principles on
occasion to preserve the Court’s standing. This reason creates an entirely different strategic dynamic within the Court, however. Power
would be transferred to the sixth or seventh Justice in some fraction
of cases.
C. Why Does the Court Take So Few Cases?
Were the Supreme Court truly interested in maximizing the
projection of its political interests, one would expect the Court to
take on as many issues as reasonably possible. For decades, the Court
granted certiorari to well over 100 cases per year.248 In the 1970s, the
Court typically granted review of over 200 cases per year, representing about 10% of the petitions filed with the Court.249 Over the years,
150 cases came to be regarded as a normal-sized docket.250 Perhaps
this was the largest number that the Court could accept while preserving the legal quality of its opinions, a quality that might be necessary to maintain its standing. However, in recent years there has been
a significant decline in the number of cases taken by the Court. In
1992, the docket slipped to eighty-three cases, representing only 3%
ronment. See id. They also found that more ideologically homogenous Courts that could command larger majorities were less responsive to the risk of reversal from an ideologically contrary Congress. See id. Justices sitting on such Courts may believe that a strong majority opinion is less likely to be overridden. See id. at 19.
246. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-169 (1991) (contending that the
Supreme Court had little to do with civil rights progress in United States).
247. This theory is not self-evident. Norms of dissent and concurrence have varied over
time at the Court and they seem to be affected significantly by the Chief Justice. See Gregory
A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court,
42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 877 (1998).
248. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 80-83 (2d ed. 1996)
(reporting the number of petitions made and granted from 1926 to 1995).
249. See id. at 82.
250. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1100 (1987).
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of the petitions filed.251 The docket remained small, and the 1995
Term saw only seventy-seven decisions.252 This has been called the
“incredibly shrinking” docket.253 Epstein and Knight’s strategic model
begs the question: why would a policy-oriented Court (or a legallyoriented one, for that matter) choose to decide so few cases?
It might be argued that twelve years of Reagan-Bush appointees
to the federal bench has resulted in the lower courts becoming very
conservative, thus minimizing the need for a conservative Supreme
Court to review a large number of cases.254 It would be hard to maintain, though, that there are only seventy-five or eighty liberal panels
and significant liberal decisions rendered per year that merit review
by the Court. Hellman has analyzed the data more closely, noting
that the certiorari acceptance rate has decreased for appeals brought
by federal and state prosecutors complaining of liberal state supreme
court decisions. He concluded that the explanation for the smaller
docket could not lie in the conservative circuit courts.255
Hellman suggests that the reason for the shrunken docket is that
the current Court has a new philosophy that does not focus on maximizing the projection of the Court’s power.256 He cautions, though,
that this makes the Court more politically active for the fewer cases
that it does accept for review.257 The hypothesis is interesting, if unproved. Moreover, Hellman’s theory does not explain why the Court
chose to pursue its new philosophy by reducing the size of its docket.
One might expect that, given a smaller docket, the Justices could
focus more on each case. The Court might therefore produce
“better” opinions.258 There does not seem to be any obvious improvement in the legal quality of more recent opinions, however.
Perhaps the greater focus better enables the Justices to study each
case and ascertain its ideological implications. But it shouldn’t be so
difficult to reach these ideological conclusions, as evidenced by the

251. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 248, at 83.
252. See Hellman, supra note 122, at 403.
253. David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J. LAW & POL. 779, 779 (1997).
254. See Garrow, supra note 202, at 65.
255. See Hellman, supra note 122, at 424.
256. See id. at 431-35.
257. See id. at 436-38.
258. See John Paul Stevens, Deciding What To Decide: The Docket and the Rule of Four, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. (1983), reprinted in JUDGES ON JUDGING, supra note 68, at 93 (suggesting that
the Court takes too many cases).
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predictive accuracy of the extremely simple attitudinal model. Perhaps taking more time in crafting opinions might enable the Justices
to create more binding rules for lower courts. By taking fewer cases,
however, the Court reduces the lower courts’ risk of reversal and
thereby encourages lower court disobedience. Perhaps the shrunken
docket reflects nothing more than pursuit of leisure,259 though one
wonders why the current Court would be so much lazier than those of
the past.260 The reason for the shrunken docket remains mysterious,
and it seems inconsistent with the conventional models of political
science, which emphasize the objective of ideological policy projection.
Within its small docket, the Court also takes a number of cases
that do not possess any political importance. Justice Harlan called
these cases “peewees.”261 Tax cases and Indian cases are two types of
cases commonly reviewed by the Court despite their political insignificance.262 The Court even chose to resolve the status of Antarctica
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, an issue of “singular unimportance” that arises “every 20 years or so.”263 Why would ideological
policy-oriented Justices squander their scarce time on such insignificant cases? Perhaps these cases are evidence that Justices care independently about the law. Or perhaps these cases are a strategic
means of convincing the public that the Justices are not unduly political.

259. See BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting that a smaller docket might be the
result of the Justices’ desire for a “reduced work load”).
260. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 256-60 (arguing that today’s Court is indeed lazier
than those of the past).
261. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: “Inconsequential” Cases and Larger
Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1996) (quoting WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra
note 15, at 148).
262. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 525 (1994) (noting the “view that tax law is less interesting or
important than other areas of law pervades even the Supreme Court” and reporting Justices’
efforts to evade writing opinions for such cases). Indian cases may have been used by Chief Justice Burger to punish disfavored Justices in opinion assignments. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 425-26. Brennan had a scatological name for these cases. See id.
at 425. Rehnquist reportedly had “nothing but contempt” for them. Id. at 490. Justice Stewart
called such cases “dogs” or “nothing cases” but observed that there are such cases every term.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 113.
263. BAUM, SUPREME COURT, supra note 70, at 114-15.
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D. Why Do the Justices Take So Many Cases That They Affirm?
Given the policy-seeking model that predominates in political
science, one would expect the Court to spend its time reversing lower
courts. When a circuit court opinion is reversed, the Court changes at
least one circuit’s policy in the favored direction, in addition to setting a national policy. An affirmance, by contrast, sets a national
policy but may not enact a change in the law.264 Affirmances thus
seem to be an inefficient use of scarce Supreme Court resources.265 In
an affirmance, one circuit has already reached the Court’s preferred
position, and others might do so if given a chance.266 The Court would
accomplish more by granting certiorari on a different case that they
would reverse.
Epstein and Knight consider this reasoning and conclude that
“we should see [the Court] reversing most of the cases they hear and
decide.”267 They then observe that this is borne out by data indicating
that the Court reverses 61% of the lower court decisions it reviews.268
Yet this leaves a substantial 39% minority of cases that result in affirmances. This large number would seem to represent quite a waste
of resources for a truly strategic Court.
One possible explanation is that the Justices are acting sincerely
and in a way that is consistent with their role expectations. Their certiorari votes may not be outcome-oriented but instead grounded in
their sincere assessment of the issue’s legal import. The various Justices may even be undecided about how they will vote on the case itself. On this view, only after briefing and perhaps oral argument will
they reach a decision, and sometimes that decision will be an affirmance. If this rather naive model were operating, one would expect a
roughly equal number of affirmances and reversals. The predominance of reversals therefore suggests that the naive model does not
fully explain behavior, although the large number of affirmances
hints that the model may at times be close to the truth.

264. In some instances, of course, an affirmance of one circuit court’s decision may very
well alter the law in another circuit.
265. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29, at 191 (“Given a finite number of cases that can
be reviewed in a given term, the Court must decide how to utilize its time, the Court’s most
scarce resource. . . . [O]verturning unfavorable lower court decisions has more of an impact.”).
266. See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 444 (observing that normally the conservative Justices
would not vote to grant certiorari in a capital case in which the defendant had lost below).
267. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 27.
268. See id.
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One could find strategic explanations for the affirmances, of
course. For example, the Justices may be aware of the significant
cases percolating their way through the courts. A conservative Court
might know that a given issue is about to come before a liberal circuit
court and may thus affirm a conservative opinion from another circuit regarding a similar issue, in order to head off the expected liberal
decision. Unfortunately, this theory is untested.
Another explanation would be that the Justices simply make
strategic mistakes.269 For example, four conservative Justices might
vote to accept certiorari in the belief that they can put together a reversal opinion in a given case. Then, after the action is accepted, they
may discover that they were wrong about their ability to get a fifth
vote. This is not inconsistent with the theory of rational choice—the
theory assumes that decisions are made strategically, not that every
actor is strategically adept. This theory of strategic error is a theory
that is readily tested—if it were true, one would expect to find that
most affirmances were 5-4 decisions. In fact, more than one-third of
the Court’s affirmances are unanimous.270
The question about affirmances is independent of the judicial
maximand. Even if one assumes that the Justices are primarily concerned with traditional legal principles, one still would not expect affirmances from a strategic judiciary. Reversing an erroneous legal
principle would generally have more impact than affirming a correct
one. Thus, the question of affirmances goes to the strategic means as
well as the assumed end. Although some affirmances may result from
mistakes in the certiorari process, certainly this cannot be true all of
the time. Alternatively, an affirmance might be used as a form of signaling a change in the Court’s direction, though this hypothesis is untested. More study of affirmances is clearly needed.
E. What About the Lower Courts?
Epstein and Knight seem to adopt a paradigm not uncommon
among political scientists interested in law: they assume that the Supreme Court is utterly political while lower courts adhere reliably to
Supreme Court precedent. Otherwise, all the battling over doctrinal
language would be meaningless, and lower courts would follow their
policy preferences regardless of Supreme Court doctrine. While the
269. Epstein and Knight note the possibility of this strategic interaction hypothesis. See id.
at 27 n.e.
270. See Kritzer et al., supra note 148, at 4.
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authors devote considerable attention to the Court’s institutional relationship with Congress and to the need to avoid legislative reversal,
they largely ignore the institutional relationships within the judicial
hierarchy and the possibility of lower court disobedience.271 Although
Epstein and Knight cannot be expected to address every strategic issue that may arise in the course of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
authors’ lack of attendance to behavior by lower courts may be the
largest lacuna in the book.
The authors observe that research “shows that lower tribunals
have a healthy respect for Supreme Court precedent.”272 The empirical case for that statement is unclear, however.273 Moreover, there is
little theoretical reason to believe that lower court judges would be
so readily obedient. The motivations of lower court judges are presumably similar to those of Supreme Court Justices.274 The legal malleability that enables the Court to act ideologically likewise should
empower lower court judges. As Walter Murphy explained:
It is true that a Justice, if he can muster a majority of the Court behind him, can usually apply more impressive sanctions against recalcitrant lower court judges than against recalcitrant colleagues, but
used alone these would hardly be likely to engender widespread acceptance of his policies. There are just too many judges and too
many cases. . . . [L]ower court judges are apt to have different orien-

271. This possibility is discussed in Cross & Tiller, supra note 10.
272. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 51.
273. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 198 (2d ed.
1991) (observing that recent studies have shown that “lower court judges have a great deal of
independence” and “‘will not follow the lead of higher courts unless conditions are favorable
for them doing so’” (quoting Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86, 91 (1976))).
274. There may be some slight difference in judicial motivations. Circuit court judges may
seek promotion to the Supreme Court, while few Justices seem to have ambitions beyond the
Court. However, the likelihood of promotion to the Court is quite low, and there are no clear
standards for promotion that would cause judges to alter their inclinations. Strong pursuit of
seemingly ideological ends may have ruined Judge Bork’s chances for the Court, but it had no
impact on Judge Scalia’s. A judge seeking promotion might try to orient his decisions in the
direction of the preferences of the President and Congress, but this strategy will not necessarily
cause the judge to be more obedient to Court precedent. Supreme Court reversal has no apparent effect on confirmation. Judge Bork and his advocates without avail noted that none of
his appellate decisions were reversed. See Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation
Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 686 (1989). Ruth Bader Ginsburg, by contrast, was reversed in a
prominent decision by the Court prior to her confirmation. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 703 F.2d 586 (1983) (holding that the state could prevent people from
sleeping in parks as a valid time, place, and manner restriction on the people’s First Amendment right to dramatize the plight of the homeless), rev’d, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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tations, different loyalties, different values, and different interests
and policy objectives than Supreme Court Justices, and intellectual
or emotional arguments alone, no matter how convincing their
rhetoric and how close their appeal to self-interest, are not likely to
275
bridge all or possibly even most of these gaps.

The Court needs a strategy to control lower court judges, or its
power will be restricted to the relatively few cases actually decided by
the Justices.
I suspect that policy-oriented Justices pay much greater heed to
the risk of lower court disobedience than to the chance of congressional reversal. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin emphasize that
an individual Justice or even the whole Court cannot make law without the cooperation of other judges.276 The need for coordination,
they argue, generally limits Justices to making relatively small, incremental changes within the parameters of existing precedent.277 The
need to gain compliance from lower courts may thus help enforce
precedent as a constraint on the Supreme Court.
Assuming that the Supreme Court is concerned with controlling
lower courts, one interesting issue is how it exercises such control.
One possibility is that control may be exercised through strategies of
review. For example, the Court might focus its review and reversals
on one particularly disobedient circuit court, correcting the extreme
circuit and perhaps attempting to intimidate the others into obedience. If so, this would add another complication to the certiorari
process. In addition to selectively taking cases for results, the Court
would also have to consider which case offers the best prospects for
controlling subsequent lower court decisions.
Obvious review strategies appear to offer relatively little promise for controlling lower courts. The Court simply cannot review
enough circuit court decisions to enforce all or even most of its preferences. The conventional legal model assumes that lower courts
follow Supreme Court precedent out of duty. This explanation does
not sit well with rational choice theory and is contrary to evidence
that circuit court panels tend to disobey precedent in order to effect
their own policy preferences.278 A recent study by Tracey George
found that circuit court en banc decisions appear to respond some275.
276.
277.
278.

MURPHY, supra note 4, at 92.
See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 143, at 2031.
See id. at 2018.
See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2173-76.
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what to the Supreme Court’s preferences.279 Yet his results incidentally demonstrated the difficulty of Supreme Court control—the association with Supreme Court preferences was statistically significant
but quantitatively weak, even though en banc decisions are far more
likely to be reviewed by the Court than are conventional circuit court
decisions.280
Another approach to the control of lower courts may be doctrinal. Perhaps certain doctrinal approaches are likely to yield greater
lower court obedience than others. Some legal researchers suggest
that establishing clear rules rather than vague standards or balancing
tests will induce greater compliance from lower courts.281 Some political scientists suggest that the clarity of Supreme Court opinions influences the degree of lower court compliance.282 One recent study has
found that greater specificity in the Court’s opinion produces a
slightly more obedient response from administrative agencies.283
These theories are mostly unproven, however. Given the Court’s
limited ability to sanction noncompliance, clear rules might only produce clear disobedience.284
Emerson Tiller offers a different sort of doctrinal strategy for
controlling the lower courts (and other institutions). His approach focuses on decision costs.285 Even if judges are motivated exclusively by
ideological ends, they must appear to justify their results through legal analysis. This means that they must confront prevailing doctrines
and evade them. The legal realism of political science maintains that
every doctrine can be evaded, but some evasions require greater time
and effort (given the need to provide a colorable legal explanation
for results). By raising decision costs, a Court can make disobedience

279. See George, supra note 3, at 1692-93.
280. See id. at 1694 (reporting that Supreme Court preferences are a “weak factor”); id. at
1677 (reporting that the Court is more than four times more likely to grant certiorari in a case
involving an en banc decision).
281. See Sullivan, supra note 143, at 57 (observing that rules “afford decisionmakers less
discretion”); Cross, supra note 3, at 322-23 (discussing the contention that clear rules better
constrain lower court discretion).
282. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 10 (1983).
283. See James F. Spriggs, II, The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A
Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1143 (1996).
284. This is the implication of McNollgast’s strategic theory. See infra text accompanying
notes 287-89.
285. See Tiller, Putting Politics into the Positive Theory of Federalism, supra note 10, at
1499-1500.
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more costly for others. Tiller has considered how lower courts may
use this strategy to avoid reversal286 but has not analyzed how the Supreme Court could employ the strategy to control lower courts.
McNollgast suggest a different type of doctrinal strategy for restraining lower court disobedience to Supreme Court opinions.287
They view appellate court judges as possessing the same basic policyoriented motivation as Supreme Court Justices.288 If the Court cannot
take every case on review, the circuit court judge has no incentive to
comply with the Court’s rulings—while some of their cases will be reversed, many others will stand at their preferred policy point. To induce lower court compliance, McNollgast suggest, the Court should
create an acceptable doctrinal interval that extends some distance
from the Court’s precise policy preference.289 If the Court correctly
sets the interval, the lower courts will be better off compromising
their preference somewhat (fitting within the interval) than implementing their preferences and risking reversal.290 The Court, on this
view, must modify the interval as the composition of the lower courts
changes.291
McNollgast’s theory is intriguing and might explain why the
Court would create relatively loose decision rules, such as a set of
standards to be applied through lower court discretion. I have some
doubts about its general descriptive power, however. While the theory is plausible under the terms of McNollgast’s example, their illustration involves only three lower courts, with a one-third prospect of
reversal by the Supreme Court.292 The interval theory is less promising in the real world, as the Court supervises thirteen circuits and reviews less than 1% of circuit court decisions. The ability to control
disobedient lower courts presents a crucial strategic challenge to the
Supreme Court, a challenge that demands greater consideration.
F. Why Isn’t Strategic Bargaining More Like Congress?
If, like members of Congress, Justices are pure policy-seekers,
they should act like members of Congress in their decisionmaking.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See Tiller & Spiller, Decision Costs, supra note 10, at 354-55.
See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts, supra note 9.
See id. at 1633.
See id. at 1644-47.
The details of this strategy are set forth in a mathematical appendix. See id. at 1675-83.
See id. at 1644.
See id. at 1645.
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Yet Epstein and Knight observe that they do not do so. While members of Congress frequently attach riders to pending bills, the Justices
do not append new political issues to pending cases.293 Nor do Justices
attempt to issue advisory opinions, perhaps the most direct and effective approach to policymaking from the bench. The institutional reason for this difference seems simple—such actions by the Court
would be obvious and would undermine its perceived status as a nonpolitical institution.294
A more curious difference involves logrolling. Logrolling occurs
when a congressperson trades votes, giving in on an issue of lower
personal priority, in order to obtain a vote on an issue of greater concern. In a true strategic situation, Justices would do likewise. A conservative Justice who cared about civil rights policy might, for example, trade a vote for criminal defendants in order to gain a civil rights
vote from a liberal Justice who cared particularly about defendants’
rights. Such an approach would appear to benefit each Justice. Unlike issue creation, logrolling could be done privately and without
threat to the public integrity of the Court.
Significantly, logrolling seldom if ever occurs on the Court.295 Epstein and Knight do not claim that vote trading commonly occurs.
Nor do the journalistic internal accounts of the Court describe logrolling.296 Murphy discusses bargaining on the Court but does not contend that logrolling occurs.297 While public logrolling might ruin respect for the Court, this reason does not explain the absence of such
behavior in private. Apparently, the Justices sacrifice one means of
achieving their policy objectives in deference to some norm. Or perhaps not. Logrolling is essentially an accession to different preference
intensities, and Justices may quietly and implicitly defer to others in
293. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 160-62.
294. Advisory opinions also violate the case-or-controversy requirement for a Constitutionally valid exercise of judicial power. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
295. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748,
764 n.86 (“In going through Justice Brennan’s papers selectively for the period from his appointment through 1967 and comprehensively for the period from 1967 to 1986, I found nothing
indicating an explicit ‘deal’ for votes.”); CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 273, at 160 (reporting
that bargaining takes place on the Court “but it is more subtle and does not involve vote swapping”).
296. The closest thing to an allegation of logrolling is the suggestion that Justice Brennan
traded a vote to gain Justice Blackmun’s support in upcoming abortion and obscenity cases.
This suggestion proved highly controversial and disputed. See Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court
Confidential, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 1980, at 3; Scott Armstrong et al., Letters to the Editor,
The Evidence of ‘The Brethren’: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 1980, at 47.
297. See MURPHY, supra note 4, at 56-68.
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the presence of such a difference.298 If a given Justice cares especially
about the Fifth Amendment, for example, other Justices might go
along in Fifth Amendment cases, in tacit exchange for support from
the given Justice on the issues of greatest concern to them. The Court
has many fewer members than Congress, and relational deals among
the Justices may not have to be so explicit. The possible presence of
such logrolling among Justices is interesting and commands further
investigation.
In some respects, many of these unanswered questions may cast
doubt upon the Epstein and Knight’s rational choice theory of Supreme Court decisionmaking, at least as a complete description.299
The strategic analysis will probably never provide a comprehensive
explanation of judicial action, if only because the Court consists of
humans with varying personalities and varying degrees of strategic
aptitude.300 But it would be premature and presumptuous to suggest
that political strategy cannot explain some currently mysterious
Court practices. Greater understanding of strategic behavior may
well lend important insight into Court action. Epstein and Knight
provide a valuable framework for seeking answers.

298. For a suggestion that logrolling may not be uncommon on courts with more than one
member, see Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2175.
299. Of course, the involvement of humans limits the predictive power of any rational
choice bargaining model. Some Justices are better at strategy, and some are better-liked. Others are disliked and strategically incompetent. The stronger strategic position might thereby be
lost. Moreover, even sound strategic decisions may backfire. Chief Justice Burger held over
Roe v. Wade for reargument, knowing that the new term would probably bring two new Republican Justices to the Court. As it happened, Justice Powell was appointed, Justice Blackmun
used the time to write a stronger opinion, and Roe was born. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at
234-35. This fact does not undermine the academic importance of understanding the strategic
structure of decisions.
300. Lawrence Baum provides an interesting example of the difficulties of studying judicial
behavior. We know from internal reports that Justice Frankfurter sought to influence his colleagues, but he was so bad at it that “[o]ne might conclude . . . that [he] did not care about influencing his colleagues.” BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 103 n.15 (quoting David J. Danelski, Causes and Consequences of Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme Court, in JUDICIAL
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, 131-32 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986)). Justice Douglas may actually have taken “perverse satisfaction in diluting his influence on his colleagues.” SIMON, supra note 15, at 101. Baum observes that congressional reversals of Court
decisions occur periodically but cautions that this may be evidence that Justices do not vote
strategically or it may simply be evidence that the Justices have made strategic errors. See
BAUM, PUZZLE, supra note 30, at 103; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 29, at 296-97 (discussing
different Justices’ different attitudes about compromise).
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CONCLUSION
Epstein and Knight’s discussion of Court strategy is by turns
compelling, fascinating, and frustrating, at least to those who hold
more traditional legal views. For many political scientists, on the
other hand, it is simply incomprehensible that the Justices might sincerely care about and be faithful to the law. While the authors largely
accept this perspective, they provide their fellow political scientists
with an argument about why the law may still matter, even if Justices
don’t care independently about it. To Epstein and Knight, strategic
maximization of policy preferences will necessarily lead to the rule of
law, including respect for precedent.301 While the concept of respect
for precedent seems unexceptional to legal scholars, that concept is
fairly radical in political science.
For legal researchers, Epstein and Knight’s book has a different
but equally important message. The authors explain how doctrine
evolves through the compromises of individual Justices and through
strategic interactions between the public policy preferences of the
Court and those of the other branches of government. This explanation is probably a more accurate depiction of reality than are the positions taken by either legal formalists, moral theoreticians, or strict
legal realists. The authors thereby add needed complexity to the contemporary state of legal analysis. The need for a still-more-complex
vision of judicial behavior does not negate the important measure of
truth in the authors’ policy-oriented strategic account.
Finally, it would be a mistake to dwell entirely upon the debate
over what Justices want, or upon unanswered questions about strategizing. Epstein and Knight seek only to make “a compelling case for
the importance of injecting strategic analysis into future studies of
the Supreme Court.”302 They have made this case most persuasively.
Even doubters cannot deny that Epstein and Knight have presented
considerable evidence that political strategy forms a component of
Supreme Court decisionmaking. The book “marks a beginning, not
the end, of an inquiry into judicial decision making.”303 The precise
character of judicial strategizing and the aims of the strategy demand
further exploration. Epstein and Knight have provided an excellent
beginning to this venture.
301. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 184 (concluding that “the legitimacy of the
system of law may be sustained even if judges act in political ways”).
302. Id. at xiv.
303. Id. at 184.
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Greater understanding of strategy will surely have consequences
for the Court. Epstein and Knight’s book makes obvious the reasons
underlying the Court’s consistent penchant for secrecy.304 The Justices
endeavor to keep their most severe disagreements private.305 They
seek to manipulate media coverage as much as other politicians.306
When the Court’s inner workings are exposed by journalistic books
such as The Brethren and Closed Chambers, the Justices and their allies tend to react angrily.307 If Epstein and Knight are correct, the Justices’ goal is to advance their policy positions, and their ability to do
so depends on their pretending to apply the law in a politically neutral manner. Exposing the Justices’ policy orientation and their strategic interactions not only makes the Court look bad, it directly reduces its power, which rests on a perception that it is above politics.
The reasons put forth for maintaining the Court’s confidentiality are
thus as insincere as many of its opinions.308 Perhaps the Court itself

304. See, e.g., David R. Fine, Lex, Lies, and Audiotape, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 461-62
(1993-94) (discussing the Court’s negative reaction to publication of audiotapes of oral arguments and to the release of the notes of Justice Thurgood Marshall); Lawrence R. Velvel, Justice at the High Court: Not Blind Enough?, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at D2 (observing that
“justices and experts” have the shared belief that “the court’s prestige and authority will be
compromised if secrecy is lost”).
305. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 15, at 102-06 (describing the efforts of certain Justices to
prevent Justice Douglas from filing dissents in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), that were perceived to risk damage to the Court).
306. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 190 (1990) (declaring
that “much of what judges say about their jobs in speeches and opinions partakes of the same
falsity that characterizes other political discourse”). Posner observes that judges seek to cover
up the “unprincipled compromises and petty jealousies and rivalries that accompany collegial
decision making . . . and the desire, conscious or not, to shape the law to one’s personal values.”
Id. at 190-91.
307. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
308. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105
YALE L.J. 2235, 2257-58 (1996). Stack argues that secrecy improves deliberative decisionmaking on the Court. However, his argument assumes that this secret deliberation involves a sincere effort by Justices to “find the law” in a traditional formalist manner. We know from Epstein and Knight and many others that this is not an accurate description of the deliberative
process. Exposing more of the process might have the effect of improving deliberation by forcing the Justices to attend more to its proper object. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory
of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1342-43 (1995) (suggesting that opening Supreme
Court deliberation could undermine judicial independence, but that judicial independence is
warranted only if the Court makes legal rather than political decisions).
A more interesting defense of secrecy and criticism of “principled frankness” is found in
Book Note, supra note 67, at 797. The author suggests that openness would delegitimate the
Court, forcing it into concessions of weakness. Even this suggestion carries the implicit and undefended assumption that the Court should play a prominent role in national policymaking. See
id.
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should be subject to some sort of Sunshine Act, so that its deliberations are more transparent. Perhaps the Justices should call public
press conferences. The need for transparency is enhanced by the
Court’s position as a nonmajoritarian institution in our democracy.309
Such openness might affect the Court’s decisionmaking.310 It might
reduce the functional role of the Court in society,311 but perhaps that
is not such a bad thing, especially if the openness adds discipline to
the Justices’ legal decisionmaking.

309. See Joel B. Grossman, Comments on “Secrecy and the Supreme Court”, 22 BUFF. L.
REV. 831, 835 (1973) (remarking that so long as judges are not directly accountable “knowing
as much as possible about what these judges are doing makes a certain amount of intuitive
sense”).
310. See Merrill, supra note 177, at 140 (“In other words, if the Court openly acknowledged
the political nature of its decisions, it would behave more like a court and less like a political
institution.”).
311. One judge, Abner Mikva, lamented that the great respect obtained by the judicial
branch was accompanied by a lack of public knowledge, expressing his fear that the courts were
“only beloved in ignorance.” On Leaving Capitol Hill for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1983,
at B8. If judicial politics were observable, the Court might command less respect. Merrill argues that Court acknowledgment of its “political discretion” would cause the political branches
to check the Court more readily. See Merrill, supra note 177, at 139.

